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Few penalties imposed on a corporate criminal offender cause as 
much consternation as do compliance monitors.  After the late-night crisis 
management meetings, after the invasive and expensive internal 
investigation, after the shakeup of senior managers, and after the protracted 
negotiations with federal authorities, companies just want to get back to 
business.  They want to sell their goods and services, be profitable, invest, 
and grow.  In short, they want to move on.  Fundamentally, the corporate 
compliance monitor stands in the way of forgetting the past and going back 
to ―business as usual‖—at least when it comes to obeying the law.  The 
monitor‘s purpose is to see that the company follows applicable laws and 
regulations going forward and institutes the proper policies and procedures 
to help ensure compliance.  Corporations will never welcome this ―tail‖ to 
their criminal prosecutions.  Monitorships inevitably involve significant 
expenditures of funds and time.  Indeed, the Government Accountability 
Office reported to Congress in November 2009 that corporations have 
expressed concern about ―how monitors were carrying out their 
responsibilities‖ and ―the overall cost of the monitorship.‖
1
  By taking the 
 
        * Mr. Warin is a partner, and Mr. Diamant and Ms. Root are associates at Gibson, 
Dunn & Crutcher LLP in Washington, D.C.  Mr. Warin and Mr. Diamant advise major 
corporations regarding their FCPA compliance monitorships.  Mr. Warin served as the 
FCPA compliance monitor for Statoil ASA and currently serves as the FCPA compliance 
monitor for Alliance One International, Inc., and as U.S. counsel to the monitor for Siemens 
AG. 
  1. Prosecutors Adhered to Guidance but DOJ Could Better Communicate: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. 11 (2009) [hereinafter Larence Testimony] (statement of Eileen R. Larence, 
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right steps, however, companies can often help tailor and guide the 
monitorships they receive to help ensure that the organization realizes 
value. 
This article explores the rise of the corporate compliance monitor as a 
condition for settling violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(―FCPA‖)—a setting in which federal prosecutors routinely impose 
monitors.  From 2004 to 2010, more than 40 percent of all companies that 
resolved an FCPA investigation with the U.S. Department of Justice 
(―DOJ‖) or Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖) through a 
settlement or plea agreement retained an independent compliance monitor 
as a condition of that agreement.
2
  And although the trend line is somewhat 
unclear, this practice seems unlikely to abate.  In 2007, almost 38% of 
corporate FCPA settlements entailed monitors; 60% in 2008; 18% in 2009; 
and 32% in 2010.
3
 
If U.S. enforcement authorities maintain their current approach, the 
reality is that companies facing liability for violating the FCPA are likely to 
have a monitor imposed on them as part of a settlement agreement.  From 
the U.S. government‘s perspective, monitorships make sense for companies 
that violate anti-bribery laws, making it important for offending 
corporations to learn how to deal with monitors.  Pulling from the authors‘ 
extensive experience with three major FCPA compliance monitorships, as 
well as their work assisting clients operating under an FCPA monitorship, 
this article aids in that process.  It also hopes to help monitors themselves, 
as well as the prosecutors who appoint them, in making the monitorship a 
more constructive feature of an FCPA settlement.  Part I provides some 
basic background on the FCPA and discusses the use of compliance 
monitors as a term in settlement agreements with federal regulators.  Part II 
examines why some companies receive a monitor as a term of an FCPA 
settlement, while others do not.  Part III discusses what FCPA monitorships 
most commonly entail.  Part IV identifies best practices for FCPA 
compliance monitors:  what they should and should not do in their quest to 
help mold an ethical organization.  Finally, Part V advises how companies 
can utilize their role in the selection, retention, and management of the 
 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government Accountability Office), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ Larence091119.pdf. 
 2. Monitors are referred to by various names, including independent consultant, 
independent compliance consultant, compliance consultant, compliance counsel, outside 
compliance consultant, etc.  Despite the various names, these individuals all, at a minimum, 
act to independently monitor a corporation and its adherence to the FCPA. 
 3. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Internal Statistical Analysis (2010) (on file with 
authors). 
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monitor to help make the process anodyne and the results valuable for the 
organization. 
I. FCPA ENFORCEMENT AND THE COMPLIANCE MONITOR AS A 
CONDITION OF SETTLEMENT 
Before delving into the details of FCPA compliance monitorships, it is 
helpful to consider briefly the FCPA and its enforcement, more generally, 
as well as recent FCPA enforcement actions that have featured a monitor. 
A. The FCPA and its Enforcement 
In 1977, following revelations about the corrupt activities of major 
U.S. corporations overseas, Congress passed the FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m 
and 78dd-1 et seq.
4
  At the heart of the statute are its anti-bribery 
provisions, which prohibit giving or offering anything of value
5
 to a foreign 
official,
6
 political party, or party official with the corrupt intent to influence 
the recipient in his or her official capacity or to secure an improper 
 
 4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, et seq. (2006). 
 5. The phrase ―anything of value‖ encompasses a broad range of items and can include 
anything a recipient would find interesting or useful, including theater tickets, gifts, stock, 
travel, education, employment, donations, and illicit items.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing that bribes ―in any form 
whatsoever‖ are within the scope of the prohibition); United States v. ABB Vetco Gray, 
Inc., No. 04-cr-00279, slip op. at 6-17 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2004) (detailing the extensive 
bribery scheme that the defendant engaged in with Nigerian governmental oil officials); 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement at Attachment A § IV(B), United States v. Daimler AG, 
No. 1:10-cr-00063 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2010), available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/ 
faculty/garrett/daimler.pdf [hereinafter Daimler Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (detailing 
the broad range of bribes employed by Daimler in China); Letter from Mark F. Mendelsohn, 
Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to Martin J. Weinstein, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, 
at app. A, Statement of Facts 8 (Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/11-14-07lucent-agree.pdf [hereinafter Lucent Technologies 
Inc. Non-Prosecution Agreement] (detailing the broad range of Lucent‘s bribes to Chinese 
government officials, including payments covering tuition and living expenses of an 
employee of a Chinese government ministry, who was obtaining a master‘s degree). 
 6. The U.S. government defines ―foreign official‖ broadly and includes any officer or 
employee, including low-level employees and officials, of a foreign government or any 
department, agency, or instrumentality of the government.  See U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Lay-
Person’s Guide to FCPA, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-
persons-guide.pdf (detailing anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA).  The statute also includes 
as ―foreign officials‖ officers and employees of public international organizations, such as 
the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the Red Cross.  See Ex. Ord. No. 
12643, June 23, 1988, 53 F.R. 24247 (conferring public international organization status 
upon the International Committee of the Red Cross); Ex. Ord. No. 9751, July 11, 1946, 11 
F.R. 7713 (conferring public international organization status upon the International 
Monetary Fund); Ex. Ord. No. 9698, Feb. 19, 1946, 11 F.R. 1809 (conferring public 
international organization status upon the United Nations). 
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advantage in order to obtain or retain business.
7
  The anti-bribery 
provisions apply to three categories of persons:  (1) ―issuers‖
8
—any 
company whose securities are registered in the United States or that is 
required to file periodic reports with the SEC; (2) ―domestic concerns‖—
any individual who is a U.S. citizen, national, or resident of the United 
States, or any business organization that has its principal place of business 
in the United States or which is organized in the United States; and 
(3) other persons who take any act in furtherance of a corrupt payment 
while within the territory of the United States.
9
 
The FCPA also contains two accounting provisions, which require 
publicly traded companies to maintain (1) accurate ―books and records‖ 
and (2) reasonably effective internal controls.
10
  Under the books-and-
records provision, issuers must ―make and keep books, records, and 
accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect 
transactions and dispositions of the assets‖ consistent with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles.
11
  The books-and-records provision 
applies to all transactions, not just corrupt activities.  Under the internal 
controls provision, issuers must implement and maintain a system of 
internal accounting controls that ―provide reasonable assurances‖ that no 
off-book accounts or disbursements or other unauthorized payments are 
made.
12
 
The FCPA does permit some payments that otherwise satisfy its 
elements.  It provides an exception for payments that facilitate or expedite 
some routine governmental actions.
13
  And it allows for two affirmative 
defenses:  (1) payments expressly permitted by the written laws of the host 
country, and (2) ―[r]easonable and bona fide expenditure[s], such as travel 
and lodging expenses . . . directly related to (A) the promotion, 
demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution 
of performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency 
 
 7. § 78dd-1(a). 
 8. If an issuer or domestic concern authorizes a third party (e.g., local agents, 
consultants, attorneys, or subsidiaries) to make payments that the issuer or domestic concern 
―knows‖ are corrupt, the issuer or domestic concern can be held liable under the FCPA.  
Knowledge means either (1) being aware of such conduct or substantially certain that such 
conduct will occur; or (2) consciously disregarding a ―high probability‖ that a corrupt 
payment or offer will be made.  See U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, supra note 6 (defining the five 
elements that must be met to constitute a violation of the FCPA). 
 9. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, & 78dd-3. 
 10. § 78m(b). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at § 78dd-1(b). 
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thereof.‖
14
  Much of the time and energy expended on FCPA compliance 
by corporate lawyers today involves ensuring that benefits provided to 
foreign officials safely fall under one of these affirmative defenses.
15
 
That corporate counsel expends much time at all worrying about the 
FCPA is a relatively recent phenomenon.  Until the past decade, FCPA 
enforcement was fairly dormant.  Years would pass without any 
prosecutions.  In fact, federal authorities brought only five enforcement 
actions in 2004.
16
  But enforcement exploded in 2007, the statute‘s thirtieth 
year, with thirty-eight enforcement actions.
17
  In 2009, this number grew to 
forty, with the DOJ bringing twenty-six alone.
18
  The SEC and DOJ 
combined for 137 enforcement actions over the past three years.
19
  Last 
year, the SEC and DOJ broke all FCPA enforcement records, with the two 
agencies combining for seventy-four enforcement actions.
20
 
FCPA enforcement can result in criminal and/or civil liability.  The 
DOJ may bring criminal and civil enforcement actions against violators; 
the SEC has civil authority only.  If a corporation violates the anti-bribery 
provisions, the criminal penalties include a $2 million fine or twice the 
pecuniary gain or loss, and possible suspension and debarment by the U.S. 
government.
21
  If a corporation violates the accounting provisions, it may 
suffer a criminal penalty of up to $25 million, per violation.
22
  Civil 
penalties may include fines and disgorgement of profits.
23
 
Ultimately, however, these monetary penalties can pale in comparison 
to the other difficulties (formal and collateral) that attend corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions.  Following the discovery of a potential FCPA 
problem, the responsible company will conduct an internal investigation 
and take appropriate remedial steps.  This usually entails a significant 
expenditure of money on attorneys‘ fees, the appropriation of employee 
time, and even the permanent loss of employees who must be terminated 
 
 14. Id. at § 78dd-1(c). 
 15. F. Joseph Warin, Michael S. Diamant, Jill M. Pfenning, FCPA Compliance in 
China and the Gifts and Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 33, 61-70 (2010). 
 16. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2010 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 3, 2011), 
available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2010Year-EndFCPA 
Update.aspx (tracking the number of FCPA enforcement actions brought by the FCPA‘s 
enforcers during the past seven years). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. (noting that ―it is clear that 2010 will go down as yet another landmark year 
for FCPA enforcement.‖).  The statistics in this paragraph include enforcement actions 
brought against individuals as well as corporations. 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 
 23. §§ 78u(d), 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e).  Disgorgement can be a significant penalty, with 
companies like Siemens AG and Daimler AG disgorging $350 million and $91.4 million, 
respectively, to settle their FCPA actions.  Infra note 86; infra note 53. 
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for improper behavior.  Once the scandal becomes public, other collateral 
consequences may include a decline in reputation or goodwill, a drop in 
stock price, lawsuits by investors or others, suspension or debarment from 
government contracting, and various tax law problems. 
The consequence on which this article focuses, the corporate 
compliance monitor, is one of the greatest challenges that may accompany 
an FCPA enforcement action.  Imposed as a condition of the settlement, the 
monitor siphons both financial and human resources, while increasing the 
probability that another corruption problem could be uncovered and the 
parade of collateral consequences could resume.  It is, therefore, little 
wonder that corporations wish to avoid monitors. 
B. Monitorships as Part of FCPA Settlements 
It is unsurprising that the government frequently imposes independent 
compliance monitors as a term of an FCPA settlement.  As some observers 
have noted, foreign bribery cases tend to involve a culture of corruption, 
trigger individual rationalizations or deflection of responsibility, and 
implicate an entire organization‘s ―social architecture‖ and incentive 
system.
24
  In other words, FCPA transgressions may reveal systemic 
problems at an organization.  This is why compliance professionals 
typically point to a ―culture of compliance‖ as the most effective tool for 
combating corporate corruption.
25
 
A federal prosecutor turning to the DOJ‘s McNulty Memorandum for 
guidance on how to handle a corporate offender is advised that ―the 
government [should] address and be a force for positive change of 
corporate culture [and] alter corporate behavior,‖
26
 while the SEC‘s 
Seaboard Report advises securities enforcement officials to consider 
whether ―a tone of lawlessness [was] set by those in control of the 
company.‖
27
  Concepts like ―tone‖ and ―culture,‖ as important as they may 
 
 24. See David Hess and Cristie Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: 
A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT‘L L.J. 307, 322 (2008) (arguing that 
requiring corporations merely to adopt a compliance program and stronger internal controls 
may be insufficient). 
 25. See H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 39-52 (1998) (arguing that an effective culture of 
compliance requires formal policies, awareness throughout the corporation, ex-ante 
vigilance, and ex-post remedies). 
 26. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep‘t of 
Justice, to Heads of Department Components and U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. 
 27. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
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be, are often hard to quantify and harder still to ensure through even very 
good policies and procedures.  Corporate culture is inherently organic, and 
altering it requires time before reforms take root and permeate the 
organization. Therefore, in addition to demanding appropriate remedial 
actions, prosecutors trying to ensure that a corporate defendant sets a 
compliant tone within the organization and changes its culture will 
undoubtedly see a ―tail‖ to a settlement in the form of a monitor as a useful 
tool.  During the years that follow the settlement, the monitor can help 
ensure that the corporation‘s leaders continue to sound the right ―tone from 
the top‖ and take the steps necessary to infuse the corporation with high 
standards of ethical behavior.  Occasionally, corporations use the presence 
of an FCPA monitor as an opportunity for effecting significant change.  As 
the DOJ‘s Morford Memorandum notes, effective monitorships help to 
―reduce[] recidivism of corporate crime and . . . protect[] the integrity of 
the marketplace.‖
28
 
A second reason why monitorships may be particularly attractive in 
the FCPA context is that overseas bribery often results from the 
environments in which companies operate, rather than representing a 
conscious decision by employees to gain a leg up on competitors.
29
  
Frequently, businesspeople complain that it is ―impossible‖ to do business 
 
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency 
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 1470, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 1470 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm. 
 28. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att‘y Gen., to Heads of 
Department Components and United States Attorneys (Mar. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [hereinafter 
Morford Memo].  See also Transparency and Integrity in Corporate Monitoring: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Committee on the Judiciary, 
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Rep. Trent Franks), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-64_53640.pdf (stating that deferred 
prosecution agreements serve to rehabilitate the company, root out illegal and unethical 
conduct, discipline culpable employees, help promote good corporate citizenship going 
forward, and allow prosecutors to achieve more than they could through court-imposed fines 
and restrictions alone). 
 29. See, e.g., Jose Armando Fanjul, Corporate Corruption in Latin America: 
Acceptance, Bribery, Compliance, Denial, Economics, and the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 26 PENN. ST. INT‘L L. REV. 735-36, n.5 (2007-2008) (―Corruption is far from being a 
novelty.  Its practice is as ancient as other social phenomena like prostitution and 
contraband.‖ (quoting INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN 
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 2 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Patricia A. 
Butenis, Ambassador, Bangl., Remarks at the Conference on Good Governance (June 25, 
2006), available at http://dhaka.usembassy.gov/06.25.06_good_governance.html (―The 
private sector needs to play a more active role in stemming the supply side of corruption.  I 
understand that most businesses look at corruption as a necessary evil.  Some have told us 
that they just account for it on their books—as much as 10%—as a cost of doing business.‖). 
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in certain countries without paying bribes.
30
  Because overseas bribery is so 
often a response to a ―shakedown‖ rather than an aggressive business 
maneuver, one would expect backsliding to be more common following an 
FCPA problem than other white collar crimes.  Again, the ―tail‖ that is the 
compliance monitorship makes this less likely. 
FCPA monitorships may attend different types of settlements with the 
U.S. authorities.  For SEC enforcement, the monitorship is usually a term 
of an administrative settlement or a final judgment entered by a court.
31
  
The DOJ usually includes the monitorship as a term in a deferred 
prosecution agreement (―DPA‖) or a non-prosecution agreement (―NPA‖), 
but monitorships have also been part of plea agreements.
32
  From 2004 
through 2010, seventy-one companies resolved FCPA allegations by 
entering into one or more of these resolutions with the DOJ or SEC.  Of 
these seventy-one companies thirty, or 42.25%, were required to retain a 
monitor as part of the resolution.  This is a significant percentage, 
especially when one considers, as a point of comparison, that from 1993 
through September 2009, DOJ prosecutors negotiated a total of 152 DPAs 
and NPAs—FCPA-related and otherwise—and forty-eight, or slightly more 
than 30%, required the imposition of a monitor.
33
 
In 2010, twenty-two corporations settled FCPA-related enforcement 
 
 30. Indeed, corporate actions in some highly corrupt countries support this contention.  
For instance, Panalpina withdrew from Nigeria following U.S. government inquiries there.  
Panalpina, Smooth Withdrawal from Nigeria, (Oct. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.panalpina.com/www/global/en/media_news/news/news_archiv_ordner/08_10_0
9.html.  And Ikea very publicly froze any additional development in Russia due to public 
corruption in that country.  Andrew E. Kramer, Ikea Plans to Halt Investment in Russia, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/24/business/ 
global/24ruble.html. 
 31. See, e.g., SEC v. Con-Way Int‘l, Inc., No. 08-cv-01478 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20690.pdf; Cease-and-
Desist Order, In re Con-Way Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 58433, Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2867 (Aug. 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/34-58433.pdf. 
 32. See, e.g., Criminal Plea Agreement, United States v. Latin Node, Inc., No. 09-cr-
20239 (S.D. Fla. 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/ 
latinnode-plea-agree.pdf (providing that the Department of Justice will be given access to all 
of the corporation‘s officers, employees, and records relating to the illegal activities 
charged);  Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Dep‘t of Justice, to Nathan J. Muyskens, 
Shook Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/ 
pdf/faculty/garrett/agco.pdf (implementing a compliance and ethics program designed to 
detect and prevent FCPA violations, as part of defendant corporation‘s plea agreement);  
Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Dep‘t of Justice, to Leo Cunningham, Wilson Sonsini 
Goodrich & Rosati (Dec. 31, 2009). 
 33. Larence Testimony, supra note 1, at 3. 
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actions with the SEC and/or DOJ.  Of these, seven retained independent 
corporate monitors as a condition of settlement: 
BAE SYSTEMS PLC (―BAES‖) – From 2000 to 2002, BAES 
represented to various U.S. government agencies that it would create and 
implement procedures designed to ensure the company‘s compliance with 
the FCPA.
34
  Allegedly, BAES knowingly and willfully failed to create 
such procedures, made a series of substantial payments to shell companies 
and third-party intermediaries, and regularly retained ―marketing advisors‖ 
to assist in securing sales of defense products.
35
  This was all allegedly 
done without BAES properly scrutinizing the relationships to ensure that 
wrongdoing did not occur.
36
  Various U.K. reporters discovered the alleged 
wrongdoing, prompting an investigation by the United Kingdom‘s Serious 
Fraud Office (―SFO‖) and eventually the DOJ.
37
  On March 1, 2010, BAES 
pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States by impairing and 
impeding its lawful functions and making false statements about the 
company‘s FCPA compliance program, as well as other items.
38
  BAES 
agreed to pay a criminal fine of $400 million and to retain an independent 
compliance monitor for three years.
39
 
INNOSPEC, INC. (―INNOSPEC‖) — From 2000 to 2003, Innospec‘s 
Swiss subsidiary, Alcor, allegedly paid or promised to pay at least $4 
million in kickbacks to the former Iraqi government as part of the United 
Nations (―U.N.‖) Oil-for-Food Program (―OFFP‖) scandal.
40
  Alcor was 
 
 34. See Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered 
to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Innospec Inc. Pleads Guilty to FCPA Charges and 
Defrauding the United Nations; Admits to Violating the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba (Mar. 
18, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-278.html; SEC 
Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Innospec, Inc. for Engaging in 
Bribery in Iraq and Indonesia with Total Disgorgement and Criminal Fines of $40.2 Million, 
Litigation Release No. 21454 (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2010/lr21454.htm.  After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United Nations 
Security Council voted to enact a resolution prohibiting member states from trading in any 
Iraqi commodities or products.  Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Flowserve Corporation to 
Pay $4 Million Penalty for Kickback Payments to the Iraqi Government Under the U.N. Oil 
for Food Program (Feb. 21, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/ 
February/08_crm_132.html.  Subsequently, the U.N. authorized Iraq to sell oil on the 
condition that the proceeds be deposited in a bank account monitored by the U.N. and used 
only to purchase designated humanitarian goods to benefit the Iraqi people.  Id.  The OFFP 
was subsequently established to administer Iraq‘s sale of oil and humanitarian goods 
purchases.  Id.  The OFFP was intended to maximize the Iraqi government‘s flexibility in 
meeting its humanitarian needs, while preventing it from undermining trade sanctions.  Id.  
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awarded five contracts valued at more than €40 million to sell tetraethyl 
lead to refineries run by the Iraqi Ministry of Oil.
41
  Alcor allegedly inflated 
the price by approximately 10% to cover the cost of the illegal payments 
before submitting them to the U.N. for approval.
42
  Innospec also admitted 
to selling chemicals to Cuban power plants, in violation of the U.S. 
embargo against Cuba.
43
  On March 18, 2010, Innospec pleaded guilty to 
the charges brought by the DOJ and entered into a settlement agreement 
with the SEC.
44
  Innospec agreed to pay a $14.1 million criminal fine to the 
DOJ and to retain an independent compliance monitor.
45
  In addition, 
Innospec, without admitting or denying the SEC‘s allegations, consented to 
the entry of a court order enjoining it from future violations and ordering it 
to disgorge $60,071,613.
46
  The SEC, however, waived all but $11.2 
million of the disgorgement.
47
  Innospec also paid a criminal fine of $12.7 
million to the SFO and $2.2 million to the U.S. Department of Treasury‘s 
Office of Foreign Assets Control.
48
 
TECHNIP S.A. (―TECHNIP‖) — For a decade, Technip allegedly paid 
Nigerian government officials bribes to obtain engineering, procurement, 
and construction contracts.
49
  Technip won contracts to construct liquefied 
natural gas facilities that were valued at more than $6 billion.
50
  On June 
28, 2010, Technip entered into a DPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay a 
$240 million criminal fine and to retain an independent compliance 
 
In practice, however, the Iraqi government was able to circumvent the OFFP‘s restrictions 
by demanding massive under-the-table payments from its contract partners. Id.  Starting in 
2000, each Iraqi ministry demanded a 10% ―after sales service fee‖ on all humanitarian 
goods purchased under the OFFP.  Id.  The fee bore no relation to any actual services and 
was, in reality, an illicit 10% kickback to the Iraqi regime.  Id. 
 41. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Innospec, supra note 40. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. SEC Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges Against Innospec, supra 
note 40. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (June 28, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-crm-751.html; SEC Charges 
Technip with Foreign Bribery and Related Accounting Violations – Technip to Pay $98 
Million in Disgorgement and Prejudgment Interest; Company Also to Pay a Criminal 
Penalty of $240 Million, Litigation Release No. 21578, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 3147 (June 28, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2010/lr21578.htm. 
 50. Id. 
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monitor for two years.
51
  In addition, Technip—without admitting or 
denying the SEC‘s allegations—entered into an agreement with the SEC, 
was enjoined from violating portions of the Exchange Act, and disgorged 
$98 million in profits.
52
 
DAIMLER AG (―DAIMLER‖) — Daimler and three of its subsidiaries, 
DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO (―DCAR‖), Export and Trade 
Finance GmbH (―ETF‖), and DaimlerChrysler China Ltd. (―DCCL‖), 
resolved allegations that they violated the FCPA.
53
  The U.S. government 
alleged that Daimler engaged in a decade-long scheme of paying bribes to 
foreign government officials to obtain contracts with government 
customers for the purchase of Daimler vehicles.
54
  Daimler and its 
subsidiaries allegedly made tens of millions of dollars in improper 
payments in at least twenty-two countries.
55
  According to the court filings, 
the improper payments were often recorded as commissions, special 
discounts, or useful or necessary payments, which were understood as 
euphemisms for ―bribes.‖
56
  Allegedly, the improper payments continued 
after the DOJ began its investigation.
57
  DCAR and ETF pleaded guilty to 
one count of conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA 
and one count of violating those provisions.
58
  Daimler and DCCL entered 
into DPAs.
59
  In total, Daimler agreed to pay a criminal fine of $93.6 
million to the DOJ, disgorge $91.4 million in profits, and retain an 
independent compliance monitor for three years.
60
 
ALLIANCE ONE INTERNATIONAL, INC. (―ALLIANCE ONE‖) —   
Alliance One‘s predecessor companies allegedly made improper payments 
in excess of $1.2 million to Thailand Tobacco Monopoly (―TTM‖) officials 
between 2000 and 2004 to obtain more than $18.3 million in sales 
contracts.61  In addition, one predecessor company allegedly paid monies to 
Kyrgyz officials to induce the purchase of tobacco for resale and made 
improper payments to certain tax officials to reduce tax penalties.  A 
different predecessor company allegedly provided improper gifts, travel, 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Daimler AG and Three Subsidiaries Resolve 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay $93.6 Million in Criminal 
Penalties (Apr. 1, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm-
360.html; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Daimler AG with Global Bribery (Apr. 1, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-51.htm. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, supra note 53. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.; Press Release, SEC, supra note 53. 
 61. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 16.  
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and entertainment to certain foreign officials.  Alliance One entered into an 
NPA with the DOJ, had foreign subsidiaries plead guilty to violating the 
FCPA‘s anti-bribery and books-and-records provisions, and settled civil 
anti-bribery, books-and-records, and internal controls charges with the 
SEC.  Alliance One paid $19.45 million to settle the matter and was 
required to retain an independent compliance monitor for the three-year 
term of its NPA. 
UNIVERSAL CORPORATION (―UNIVERSAL‖) – Between 2000 and 
2004, Universal allegedly paid approximately $800,000 to TTM officials to 
obtain approximately $11.5 million in sales contracts for its Brazilian and 
European subsidiaries.62  It also allegedly paid $165,000 to government 
officials in Mozambique to secure an exclusive right to purchase tobacco 
from regional growers and to influence the passage of favorable 
legislation.  Finally, Universal allegedly made improper payments totaling 
$850,000 to high-ranking Malawian officials.  Universal also entered into 
an NPA with the DOJ, had foreign subsidiaries plead guilty to violating the 
FCPA‘s anti-bribery and books-and-records provisions, and settled civil 
anti-bribery, books-and-records, and internal controls charges with the 
SEC.  Universal paid $10 million to settle the matter and was required to 
retain an independent compliance monitor for the three-year term of its 
NPA.  
ALCATEL-LUCENT, S.A. (―Alcatel-Lucent‖) — On December 27, 
2010, Alcatel-Lucent settled with the DOJ and SEC, resolving allegations 
of widespread bribery of foreign government officials.63  According to the 
charging documents, from 2002 to 2006, prior to its merger with Lucent 
Technologies, Inc., Alcatel S.A. used third-party agents to pay more than 
$8 million in bribes to government officials in Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Malaysia, and Taiwan in exchange for hundreds of millions of dollars 
worth of public-sector telecommunications contracts.  To resolve the SEC‘s 
complaint, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to pay $45.4 million in disgorgement and 
consented to an injunction from future violations of the anti-bribery, books-
and-records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA.  To resolve the 
criminal charges, Alcatel-Lucent consented to the filing of information 
charging it with violating the books-and-records and internal controls 
provisions, three of its subsidiaries pleaded guilty to FCPA conspiracy 
counts, and the companies paid a combined criminal fine of $92 million.  
The parent company‘s charges are stayed for the three-year term of a DPA.  
Alcatel-Lucent also paid $10 million to settle corruption charges filed by 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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Costa Rican authorities, the first time in Costa Rica‘s history that it has 
recovered damages from a foreign corporation for corruption of its own 
government officials.  This case marks just the second time in the history of 
the FCPA—the first being Siemens AG (―Siemens‖) in 2008—that a 
company has resolved criminal internal controls charges. 
Fifteen settlements did not require the retention of a compliance 
monitor: 
NATCO GROUP INC. (―NATCO‖) — In February and September of 
2007, a NATCO subsidiary, TEST Automation & Controls, Inc. (―TEST‖), 
allegedly made improper payments totaling approximately $45,000 to 
Kazakh government officials.
64
  The bribes were paid in response to an 
extortion threat.
65
  Kazakh immigration prosecutors had conducted audits 
and claimed that TEST Kazakhstan‘s expatriate workers were working 
without proper immigration documentation.
66
  The prosecutors threatened 
the employees with fines, jail, or deportation if they did not pay cash 
―fines.‖
67
  The employees capitulated and received reimbursement from 
TEST, which documented the payments as advances on a ―bonus.‖
68
  In late 
2007, NATCO discovered the payments during a routine internal audit 
review.  NATCO conducted an internal investigation and voluntarily 
disclosed the matter to the SEC.
69
  Allegedly, the company‘s ―system of 
internal accounting controls failed to ensure that TEST recorded the true 
purpose of the payments.‖
70
  Without admitting or denying the allegations 
in the SEC‘s complaint, NATCO consented to the entry of a cease and 
desist order and agreed to pay a civil penalty of $65,000.
71
  The SEC 
considered these remedial efforts when accepting NATCO‘s offer of 
settlement.
72
 
NEXUS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (―NEXUS‖) — From 1999 to May 2008, 
Nexus allegedly bribed foreign officials from Vietnam and Russia in an 
attempt to induce them to influence decisions of their respective 
governments and direct business to Nexus.
73
  The bribes were falsely 
 
 64. SEC Files Settled Action Charging NATCO Group Inc. with Violations of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Litigation Release No. 21374, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 3102 (Jan. 11, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2010/lr21374.htm. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Press Release, Nexus Technologies Inc. and Three Employees Plead Guilty to 
Paying Bribes to Vietnamese Officials (Mar. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-270.html. 
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described as ―commissions‖ in the company‘s records.
74
  As part of its 
guilty plea, Nexus agreed to cease operations.
75
  On March 16, 2010, the 
company pleaded guilty to the charges;
76
 on September 15, 2010, the 
district court imposed the ―corporate death penalty‖ on Nexus, finding that 
Nexus was a ―criminal purpose organization‖ under section 8C1.1 of the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and ordering a dissolution of the organization, 
with all of its assets to be turned over to the court.  Three Nexus employees 
and one business partner were also prosecuted as part of this scandal, two 
of whom received prison terms. 
VERAZ NETWORKS, INC. (―VERAZ‖) — From 2007 to 2008, Veraz 
employed a consultant in China who allegedly gave gifts and offered 
improper payments to government officials, attempting to obtain business 
for Veraz.
77
  The value of the gifts and payments was approximately 
$40,000.
78
  During the same period, a Veraz employee made improper 
payments to the CEO of a Vietnam government-controlled 
telecommunications company.
79
  These improper payments were also given 
in an attempt to obtain business for Veraz.
80
  The alleged misconduct was 
discovered when Veraz conducted an internal investigation in response to 
an SEC inquiry involving an unrelated issue.
81
  Veraz provided information 
regarding the improper payments to the SEC.
82
  On June 29, 2010, without 
admitting or denying the allegations in the SEC‘s complaint, Veraz 
consented to the entry of a final judgment enjoining it from future 
violations of portions of the Exchange Act and ordering it to pay a 
$300,000 civil penalty.
83
 
ENI S.P.A (―ENI‖) — Italian integrated energy company, ENI, and its 
Dutch subsidiary, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. (―Snamprogetti‖), settled 
FCPA charges stemming from alleged bribes paid by its joint venture to 
senior Nigerian officials to obtain approximately $6 billion worth of 
engineering, procurement, and construction contracts.84  ENI and 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. SEC Charges California Telecommunications Company with FCPA Violations, 
Litigation Release No. 21581 (June 29, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2010/lr21581.htm. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2010 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 3, 2011), 
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Snamprogetti jointly consented to the entry of an injunction against future 
FCPA violations and agreed to disgorge $125 million to the SEC.  
Snamprogetti also entered into a DPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay a 
$240 million criminal fine.  This case is related to the above-discussed 
Technip matter, which did involve the imposition of a monitor. 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. (―GE‖) — On July 27, 2010, GE and two 
companies that were acquired by GE after they allegedly committed 
wrongdoing, Amersham plc and Ionics, Inc., settled civil charges alleging 
violations of the FCPA‘s accounting provisions arising from the 
participation of certain foreign subsidiaries in the OFFP.85  Without 
admitting or denying the SEC‘s allegations, GE, Amersham, and Ionics 
each consented to the entry of a permanent injunction against future 
violations of the books-and-records and internal controls provisions of the 
FCPA, GE paid a civil penalty of $1 million, and all three entities 
collectively disgorged approximately $22.5 million in profits plus 
prejudgment interest.  GE‘s settlement is noteworthy among both OFFP 
settlements and FCPA settlements more broadly for at least two reasons.  
First, GE is the only company out of sixteen to settle OFFP-related charges 
that has avoided criminal prosecution.  Second, this settlement marks an 
aggressive use of successor liability by the SEC, as GE was required to 
disgorge allegedly illicit profits earned by businesses independent of GE at 
the time of the wrongdoing.  
MERCATOR CORP. (―MERCATOR‖) — On August 6, 2010, Mercator 
pleaded guilty to one count of violating the FCPA‘s anti-bribery provisions 
in connection with the 1999 gifting of two snowmobiles to senior officials 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan.86  On November 19, 2010, the district court 
sentenced Mercator to pay a $32,000 fine.  This brought to an end one of 
the longest-running investigations in the history of the FCPA.   
ABB LTD. (―ABB‖) — On September 29, 2010, Swiss ADR-issuer 
ABB resolved criminal and civil FCPA charges with the DOJ and SEC, 
arising from two separate allegedly improper payment schemes.87  The first 
involved six ABB subsidiaries based in Europe and the Middle East that 
allegedly paid approximately $810,000 (and agreed to pay an additional 
$240,000) to the Iraqi government in connection with thirty OFFP 
contracts.  The second, unrelated scheme concerned a U.S.-based 
subsidiary of ABB that, between 1997 and 2004, allegedly paid 
approximately $1.9 million through various intermediaries to officials of 
state-owned utility companies in Mexico in exchange for approximately 
$90 million in contracts.  To resolve the criminal charges alleging 
 
supra note 16. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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conspiracies to violate the wire fraud statute and books-and-records 
provision of the FCPA, ABB entered into a three-year DPA and agreed to 
pay a criminal fine of $1.9 million.  Additionally, ABB‘s U.S. subsidiary 
pleaded guilty to violating and conspiring to violate the FCPA‘s anti-
bribery provisions and paid a $17.1 million fine (down from the $28.5 
million fine stipulated in the plea agreement, based on a finding by the 
district court that the U.S. subsidiary was not, as the DOJ had claimed, a 
recidivist violator of the FCPA).  To settle civil charges with the SEC, 
ABB consented to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting future 
violations of the anti-bribery, books-and-records, and internal controls 
provisions of the FCPA and paid more than $39.3 million in penalties, 
disgorgement, and prejudgment interest.  
RAE SYSTEMS INC. (―RAE‖) — Between 2004 and 2008, two of 
RAE‘s majority-owned joint ventures in China provided their third-party 
agents with cash advances generated through false or misleading invoices, 
portions of which were passed on to Chinese officials.88  RAE allegedly 
uncovered this practice during pre-acquisition due diligence for one of the 
joint ventures, but failed to implement a system of internal controls 
sufficient to stop the payments post-acquisition.  With respect to the other 
joint venture, RAE allegedly failed to conduct any FCPA due diligence in 
connection with the transaction, and as a result, the company continued to 
make improper payments following the acquisition.  To resolve the 
criminal allegations, RAE entered into an NPA with the DOJ, agreeing to 
pay a $1.7 million fine.  The DOJ cited RAE‘s substantial cooperation with 
the investigation and its voluntary disclosure of the conduct as factors 
relevant to the decision to resolve the matter with an NPA.  With respect to 
the SEC, RAE consented to the entry of a civil injunction against future 
violations of the FCPA‘s accounting provisions and agreed to disgorge 
approximately $1.1 million in allegedly ill-gotten profits, plus 
approximately $100,000 in prejudgment interest.  
The other seven 2010 corporate settlements were part of an industry 
sweep of the global oil and oil services industry.89  Industry sweeps have 
become a typical approach of the DOJ and SEC in recent years.  The 
companies involved were a global freight forwarder, PANALPINA WORLD 
TRANSPORT (HOLDING), LTD. (―Panalpina‖), and six oil and oil service 
firms (most of which were Panalpina customers), ROYAL DUTCH SHELL 
PLC; TRANSOCEAN, INC. (―Transocean‖); TIDEWATER MARINE INT‘L, INC.; 
PRIDE INT‘L INC.; NOBLE CORP.; and GLOBALSANTAFE CORP. 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
DIAMANTFINALIZED_ONE_UPDATED 3/22/2011  4:25 PM 
2011] FCPA MONITORSHIPS AND HOW THEY CAN WORK BETTER 337 
 
(―GlobalSantaFe‖).  The origin of much of this investigation dates back to 
February 2007, when three subsidiaries of global oil services company 
Vetco International Ltd. resolved FCPA charges arising from improper 
payments made on their behalf by Panalpina.  In the wake of the Vetco 
settlement, on July 2, 2007, the DOJ sent letters to eleven oil and oil 
services companies, requesting information about their dealings with 
Panalpina.  With the exception of GlobalSantaFe (which merged with 
Transocean in 2007, presumably making it subject to the terms of the 
Transocean agreement) each of these companies entered into a DPA or 
NPA with the DOJ and paid a substantial criminal fine.  All seven 
corporations involved consented to the filing of a civil complaint or 
administrative action by the SEC and disgorged profits from the allegedly 
improper conduct.  These seven settlements resulted in more than $230 
million in disgorgement, fines, and penalties. 
II. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE GOVERNMENT‘S DECISION TO REQUIRE 
AN FCPA MONITOR 
The settlements from 2010 demonstrate that it is hard to determine 
from the factual recitation of any given case precisely what factors prove 
dispositive in the government‘s desire for a compliance monitor as a 
condition of settlement.  If anything, an examination of the past half-decade 
of FCPA settlements show that no single factor wholly determines whether 
the DOJ or SEC will require a company to retain a monitor.  Although 
prosecutors consider a variety of issues,
90
 at least two factors emerge as 
those most determinative of whether the FCPA settlement will include a 
monitorship:  (1) the degree of ingrained corruption at the corporation; and 
(2) the existence of an effective corporate compliance program prior to the 
offense.  Companies with a more entrenched culture of corruption and 
those lacking effective compliance programs seem most likely to receive 
FCPA monitors, while the nature of the actual underlying offenses appears 
to be a less important consideration. 
A. Culture of Corruption 
The pervasiveness of corrupt activity within a corporation seems to 
significantly affect whether or not it receives a compliance monitor.  Past 
settlement agreements indicate that prosecutors look at the corporate 
 
 90. See Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate 
Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 698 (2009) (discussing multiple factors that are 
considered when deciding whether to require a corporate monitor as part of a settlement 
agreement); see also Morford Memo, supra note 28, at 2 (explaining that a ―monitor should 
only be used where appropriate given the facts and circumstances of a particular matter‖). 
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culture and consider whether it itself is ―corrupt‖ and in need of further 
reform and monitoring.  Indicators of such a pervasive culture include the 
existence of widespread misconduct
91
 and whether wrongdoing is condoned 
by the organization‘s upper management.
92
  This is in contrast to the 
misconduct of a few rogue actors.
93
  In the latter situation, it appears that 
prosecutors are much less likely to demand a monitor. 
The quintessential example of pervasive corporate corruption is the 
Siemens prosecution.  Court filings alleged that Siemens made thousands 
of corrupt payments to third parties in a manner contemplated to obscure 
the purpose of the transactions and ultimate recipients of the money.
94
  ―At 
least 4,283 of those payments, totaling approximately $1.4 billion, were 
used to bribe government officials in return for business to Siemens around 
 
 91. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Transcript of Press Conference 
Announcing Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Violations (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/ 
08-opa-1112.html (describing Siemens‘s conduct as ―egregious‖). 
 92. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. AGA Med. Corp., No. 
0:08-cr-00172-1 (D. Minn. June 3, 2008) (alleging that a high-ranking officer and part 
owner with power to set policy condoned violations).  Interestingly, although this agreement 
requires that AGA Medical Corporation engage a monitor by August 2, 2008, we 
understand that, at least as of June 2010, no monitor has been approved.  No public 
explanation for the delay has been issued.  In the fourth quarter of 2010, St. Jude Medical, 
Inc., acquired AGA Medical Corporation, but relevant SEC filings do not indicate whether a 
monitor has been appointed.  See St. Jude Medical, Inc., Form S-4 (Oct. 20, 2010), available 
at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/203077/000104746910008733/0001047469-10-
008733.txt. 
 93. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Helmerich & Payne Agrees to Pay $1 
Million Penalty to Resolve Allegations of Foreign Bribery in South America (July 30, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-741.html (discussing 
the mitigating factors of Helmerich and Payne‘s voluntary disclosure and self-investigation, 
which ultimately allowed it to settle without a monitor being imposed). 
 94. A collection of all of the most important court documents in the Siemens case is 
located on Siemens‘s website as a compiled document.  See Complaint at 2, SEC v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-02167), available at 
http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/2008-12-PK/SEC.pdf [hereinafter Siemens 
Complaint]; Final Judgment, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) 
(No. 1:08-cv-02167), available at http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/2008-12-
PK/SEC.pdf [hereinafter Siemens Final Judgment]; Consent, SEC v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-02167), available at 
http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/2008-12-PK/SEC.pdf [hereinafter Siemens 
Consent]; Certificate of Corporate Resolution, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. 
Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-02167), available at http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/ 
de/events/2008-12-PK/SEC.pdf; Civil Cover Sheet, SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, 
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-02167), available at http://www.siemens.com/press/ 
pool/de/events/2008-12-PK/SEC.pdf. 
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the world.‖
95
  Multiple corporate segments at Siemens, including 
Communications, Industrial Solutions, Medical Solutions, Power 
Generation, Power Transmission, and Transportation Systems, allegedly 
engaged in bribery.
96
  To make matters worse, investigations in Italy and 
other countries had alerted Siemens‘s top management well in advance to a 
corruption problem; and yet, according to prosecutors, nothing was done to 
bolster the company‘s internal compliance program.
97
  Unsurprisingly, 
Siemens received a compliance monitor, despite its herculean remediation 
efforts and expansive internal investigation.
98
 
In the case of Faro Technologies, Inc. (―Faro‖), the violations did not 
permeate the company as in the Siemens case, but rather just upper 
management, who allegedly knew about the corrupt payments.
99
  The 
Director of Asia-Pacific Sales (―Sales Director‖) recommended a former 
employee of Faro‘s Chinese distributor for a new Country Sales Manager 
position.
100
  After the Country Manager was hired, he requested permission 
from the Director of Asia-Pacific Sales and two other Faro officers to ―do 
business the Chinese way‖ and bribe officials.  The request was officially 
denied, but soon after, the Sales Director authorized the Country Manager 
to make illegal cash payments to employees of Chinese state-owned 
companies to obtain contracts.
101
  The Country Manager repeatedly 
expressed the need to provide cash in return for the award of contracts, and 
the Sales Director indicated his understanding of this need and continued to 
approve the transactions.
102
  To ensure the scheme was not discovered, the 
Sales Director instructed Faro-China‘s staff to alter account entries and 
delete those referring to improper payments.
103
  While this conduct 
transpired, Faro failed to provide any training or education regarding the 
 
 95. Siemens Complaint, supra note 94, at 2. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See MARTIN T. BIEGELMAN & DANIEL R. BIEGELMAN, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT COMPLIANCE GUIDEBOOK: PROTECTING YOUR ORGANIZATION FROM BRIBERY AND 
CORRUPTION 112-14 (2010) (discussing Siemens‘s leniency and amnesty programs for 
current and former employees as tools to gain additional information and evidence). 
 99. See Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Statoil ASA Satisfies Obligations Under 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Foreign Bribery Charges are Dismissed (Nov 19, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-crm-1257.html 
(discussing Statoil‘s acknowledgement that it had made corrupt payments and its agreement 
to pay a $10.5 million penalty). 
 100. See generally Cease-and-Desist Order, Faro Techs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
57933, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement No. 2836 (June 5, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/34-57933.pdf [hereinafter Faro Techs. Cease-and-
Desist Order]. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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FCPA to its employees, agents, or subsidiaries.
104
  In addition, Faro lacked 
an established corporate program to monitor its business operations to 
ensure compliance with the FCPA.  The U.S. prosecutors required Faro, 
like Siemens, to retain a monitor.
105
 
In contrast, the relevant conduct generally seemed less pervasive at 
companies that were not required to retain a monitor.  It appears, although 
it is by no means a rule, that the government tends not to impose monitors 
when the illegal conduct is limited to just a few individuals within a 
company or when the conduct was limited in its scope.
106
 
In the case of hedge fund Omega Advisors, Inc., a single employee 
was responsible for the inappropriate conduct.
107
  Indeed, there was no 
evidence of corruption or improper conduct outside the actions of the 
isolated employee.
108
  Omega entered into an NPA, but was not required to 
retain an outside monitor.  Similarly, the SEC did not require Oil States 
International (―Oil States‖) to retain a monitor to resolve wrongdoing at the 
company.
109
  Employees in the eastern Venezuelan branch office of an Oil 
States subsidiary, Hydraulic Well Control, LLC, allegedly made corrupt 
payments.
110
  The conduct was limited to this single branch office and did 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. There are other instances where improper conduct involving the ratification of high-
level officials resulted in the imposition of an independent compliance monitor.  See, e.g., 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Willbros Group, Inc., No. 08-cr-0287 
(S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008) [hereinafter Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement]; SEC 
Sanctions Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation for Improper Payments to 
Indian Government Employees, Litigation Release No. 20457 (Feb. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20457.htm. 
 106. See, e.g., Cease-and-Desist Order, Oil States Int‘l, Inc., Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 53732, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2424 (Apr. 27, 
2006) [hereinafter Oil States Cease-and-Desist Order] (finding that the illegal conduct was 
limited to employees of a subsidiary). 
 107. Letter from Michael J. Garcia, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, 
to Robert J. Annelo, Morvillo, Abramowitz, Grand, Iason, Anello, & Bohrer, P.C. (June 19, 
2007), available at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/omegaadvisors.pdf; 
Press Release, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, S. Dist. N.Y., U.S. Announces Settlement with 
Hedge Fund Omega Advisors, Inc. in Connection with Omega‘s Investment in Privatization 
Program in Azerbaijan (Jul. 6, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/ 
pressreleases/July07/omeganonprospr.pdf. 
 108. Similarly, the illegal conduct in the Immucor case was also limited to a single 
individual.  Immucor was not required to hire a monitor.  See SEC Files Action Naming 
Officer of Immucor, Inc., Litigation Release No. 20316 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at 
http://fcpaenforcement.com/FILES/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/4495/DeChirico 
PressRelease.pdf (describing a final judgment ordering payment of a $30,000 civil penalty). 
 109. Oil States Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 106. 
 110. Id. 
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not represent typical Oil States business dealings.  Furthermore, the 
improper conduct was isolated to low-level employees; there was no 
indication that senior management was involved. 
It is unsurprising for at least two reasons that prosecutors are more 
likely to require monitors in cases of pervasive FCPA violations.  First, 
because the illegal conduct is widespread, eliminating it is more difficult 
and time-consuming.  This may very well result from a culture of 
corruption within the company—ingrained business practices that are 
difficult to uproot.  A more thorough review of a company‘s activities is 
probably necessary to engage employees in a range of businesses and 
locations and help the company stamp out lingering pockets of non-
compliance.  Such a task is well-suited for a monitor who can dedicate 
himself or herself to reviewing the various functions and businesses 
independently. 
The second reason why monitors may make more sense in cases of 
pervasive corruption is that they also often point to an ineffective system of 
internal controls.  Developing such a system is often a complex, laborious, 
and time-intensive project.  Undoubtedly, by the time the monitor begins 
his or her work, the company will have embarked on a remedial 
augmentation of its internal controls; the monitor, however, can provide 
invaluable guidance on where weaknesses remain or risks linger, 
insufficiently addressed.  Due to the expense and inconvenience of many 
internal controls, the monitor‘s independence and authority may aid the 
company in instituting needed controls in spite of grumbling from the 
business line. 
B.  Existence and Enforcement of Internal Compliance Programs 
In fact, the existence of an effective compliance program is perhaps 
independently the most important factor in whether or not a company 
receives a monitor.  The Morford Memorandum specifically states that ―it 
may be appropriate to use a monitor where a company does not have an 
effective internal compliance program, or where it needs to establish 
necessary internal controls.‖
111
  In light of this guidance, prosecutors 
heavily weigh the pre-existence of an effective compliance program 
designed to detect and guard against illegal activity.  For example, the 
Micrus Corporation (―Micrus‖)
112
 and GE InVision Inc. (―InVision‖)
113
 
 
 111. See Morford Memo, supra note 28, at 2. 
 112. See Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Micrus Corporation Enters into Agreement to 
Resolve Potential Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Liability (Mar. 2, 2005), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/March/05_crm_090.htm  (requiring Micrus to retain an 
independent policy expert for a period of three years as a result of its criminal violations of 
the FCPA). 
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agreements noted that the offending companies had no effective FCPA 
compliance programs; prosecutors required monitors in both cases.  In 
contrast, the SEC did not impose a monitor on ITT.  At the time of the 
allegedly improper conduct, the company already had in place a Corporate 
Compliance Ombudsman program to receive and respond to complaints of 
alleged wrongdoing throughout the organization.
114
 
The mere existence of a compliance program, however, is not in itself 
enough to ward off the imposition of a monitor.  Indeed, the government is 
particularly sensitive to instances where compliance programs were clearly 
ineffective or effectively ignored.
115
  ―Paper programs‖ are simply 
insufficient.  The United States Sentencing Guidelines outline the 
requirements of an effective compliance and ethics program.
116
  
Organizations must (1) establish standards and protocols to prevent and 
detect criminal conduct; (2) require organizational leaders, including the 
board and senior management, to supervise the program; (3) use reasonable 
efforts to exclude individuals who have engaged in illegal activities or 
other improper conduct from supervising the compliance program; 
(4) regularly train employees and furnish them with information regarding 
the organization‘s compliance program; (5) monitor, evaluate, and 
publicize the organization‘s compliance program to ensure its continued 
effectiveness; (6) promote the compliance and ethics program through 
incentives to act in accordance with the program and disciplinary measures 
for failing to adhere to the program requirements; and (7) take reasonable 
 
 113. See GE InVision Inc., Security Act Release No. 51199, Accounting and 
Enforcement Release No. 2186 (Feb. 14, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
admin/34-51199.htm (describing an order instituting a cease-and-desist proceeding and 
indicating that ―InVision provided no formal training or education to its employees . . . or its 
sales agents and distributors regarding the requirements of the FCPA‖ and ―failed to 
establish a program to monitor its foreign agents and distributors for compliance with the 
FCPA‖). 
 114. See SEC Files Settled Charges Against ITT Corporation, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 2934, Litigation Release No. 20896, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr20896.htm (discussing the failure of ITT to 
maintain proper books, records, and accounts with sufficient detail to account for the actions 
of its subsidiary, NGP). 
 115. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to 
Bribing Kazakh Official and Agrees to Pay $11 Million Criminal Fine as Part of Largest 
Combined Sanction Ever Imposed in FCPA Case (Apr. 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_296.html (describing Baker Hughes‘s 
agreement to hire an independent monitor for a period of three years to oversee its 
compliance program and make proper reports to the company and the DOJ). 
 116. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b) (2010).  Please 
note that this version of the Sentencing Guidelines went into effect on November 1, 2010. 
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steps, if criminal conduct is discovered, to address the conduct and make 
any needed changes to the organization‘s compliance and ethics program to 
prevent future misbehavior.
117
 
C.  No Clear Pattern Emerges From Other Aspects of the Enforcement 
Actions 
Surprisingly, the nature of the underlying improper payments that 
drive the enforcement action in the first place does not seem to be 
determinative (with the limited exception of the OFFP prosecutions).
118
  An 
analysis of DPAs and NPAs formed since 2004 shows no clear, over-
arching pattern in this regard.  It also suggests that factors such as whether 
a company voluntarily discloses the FCPA violations, the amount of bribes 
paid, and the amount of business gained by the bribes do not seem to have 
much predictable effect on whether a company must hire a monitor. 
One might expect that the amount of bribes paid and the financial 
benefit they generated would play a major role in determining whether a 
company receives a monitor, but this does not appear to be the case.  For 
example, the government did not require Lucent Technologies to hire a 
monitor after paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in benefits related to 
 
 117. Id. at 32-34.  The 2010 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines provide an 
additional Application Note, which clarifies the meaning of § 8B2.1(b)(7).  The addition 
states that subsection (b)(7) has two aspects: 
 First, the organization should respond appropriately to the criminal conduct. 
The organization should take reasonable steps, as warranted under the 
circumstances, to remedy the harm resulting from the criminal conduct.  These 
steps may include, where appropriate, providing restitution to identifiable 
victims, as well as other forms of remediation. Other reasonable steps to 
respond appropriately to the criminal conduct may include self-reporting and 
cooperation with authorities. 
 Second, the organization should act appropriately to prevent further similar 
criminal conduct, including assessing the compliance and ethics program and 
making modifications necessary to ensure the program is effective. The steps 
taken should be consistent with subsections (b)(5) and (c) and may include the 
use of an outside professional advisor to ensure adequate assessment and 
implementation of any modifications. 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 34-35 (May 3, 
2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2010_guidelines/Proposed_ 
Amendments/20100503_Reader_Friendly_Proposed_Amendments.pdf. 
 118. Few OFFP-related settlements have resulted in the imposition of a compliance 
monitor.  This may reflect the unusual nature of these cases, involving a unique U.N. 
program and improper conduct that was required by the highest levels of the Iraqi 
government.  In fact, with the exception of the Ingersol-Rand settlement, only those cases 
that also involve other improper conduct outside of the OFFP (e.g., the Daimler, Innospec, 
and Siemens settlements) have resulted in a monitorship. 
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approximately $2 billion worth of potential business.
119
  Compare this to 
the Monsanto Company agreement, which imposed a monitor when the 
underlying bribe was only $50,000.
120
  Likewise, the Schering-Plough 
Corporation agreement mandated a monitor to settle a case involving only 
$76,000 in improper payments.
121
 
One of the most unusual incongruities in the U.S. government‘s 
imposition of FCPA monitors arose out of an FCPA case in which federal 
prosecutors alleged that four companies, Halliburton Co./KBR, Inc./ 
Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, Technip, Snamprogetti, and JGC Corporation 
of Japan, conspired to bribe Nigerian officials.  (The Technip and 
Snamprogetti settlements are discussed above.)  Surprisingly—and without 
explanation—the regulators imposed an FCPA compliance monitor on 
KBR, Inc., and Technip, but did not require a monitor as a term of its 
settlement with Snamprogetti.
122
 
Other factors that one might reasonably anticipate would usually 
 
 119. Lucent Technologies Inc. Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5, at 2. See 
Complaint at 11, SEC v. Lucent Techs. Inc. (D.D.C. 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2007/comp20414.pdf (describing expectations of 
potential business opportunities reaching $2-3 billion). 
 120. See Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Monsanto Company Charged with Bribing 
Indonesian Government Official: Prosecution Deferred for Three Years (Jan. 6, 2005), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/January/05_crm_008.htm (describing the 
repercussions of Monsanto‘s attempted payment of $50,000 to an Indonesian official to 
induce him to modify the requirements of an environmental impact statement). 
 121. See generally SEC v. Schering-Plough Corp., Litigation Release No. 18740, (June 
9, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18740.htm.  It is an open 
question, however, if these matters arose today in the current mega-monetary-sanction 
environment, whether the government would impose a monitor. 
 122. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 4, United States v. Technip S.A., No. H-10-
439 (S.D. Tex. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/ 
06-28-10-technip-agreement.pdf [hereinafter Technip Deferred Prosecution Agreement] 
(discussing Technip‘s conduct related to corrupt payments and false books); Press Release, 
Dep‘t of Justice, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (July 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-crm-780.html (describing Snamprogetti‘s 
agreement to pay a $240 million penalty for its involvement over a ten-year period in 
bribing Nigerian government officials to obtain various procurement and construction 
contracts); Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to 
Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-crm-112.html (describing 
Kellogg‘s guilty plea relating to its participation in a decade-long scheme to bribe Nigerian 
government officials to grant various contracts); Press Release, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, SEC Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm (discussing KBR 
Halliburton‘s agreement to pay $177 million in disgorgement to settle its SEC fines). 
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influence a prosecutor‘s decision in this area are also not determinative.  
For example, a company‘s willingness to report its misconduct voluntarily 
or to cooperate with prosecutors does not seem to affect whether the 
government mandates the appointment of a monitor.  In fact, in many 
settlements where prosecutors noted the company‘s efforts at self-reporting 
and willingness to cooperate, the government still required monitors.  Of 
the thirty companies that received compliance monitors from 2004 to 2010, 
twenty voluntarily disclosed the improper conduct to the government, 
which seems to exemplify the adage that no good deed goes unpunished.  
All of this is not to say that factors such as the amount paid in bribes, the 
amount of business acquired through bribes, and a company‘s willingness 
to cooperate are irrelevant to prosecutors‘ decisions.  But these factors have 
no consistently evident or measureable effects on whether the government 
will require a company to retain a monitor as a term of an FCPA settlement 
agreement. 
III. COMMON TERMS OF FCPA MONITORSHIPS 
Today, no official definition of a compliance monitor exists, and this 
is unlikely to change.  The United States Sentencing Commission recently 
considered a proposed amendment to § 8D1.4 of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines.  The proposed amendment would have required 
that a monitor be independent and properly qualified and that the scope of 
the monitorship be subject to court approval.  On April 7, 2010, the 
Sentencing Commission rejected this proposal, leaving the status quo of 
DOJ and SEC oversight and control.
123
 
Each FCPA monitorship is strictly a creation of the settlement with the 
government, and the settlement agreement, in effect a written contract, 
 
 123. Corporate counsel were largely uneasy about having the Sentencing Guidelines 
formally address the issue of monitors.  See Susan Hackett, Ass‘n of Corporate Counsel, 
Testimony to the U.S. Sentencing Commission regarding proposals to amend Chapter 8 of 
the Guidelines Manual 3 (Mar. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/ 
20100317/Hackett_ACC_Testimony.pdf (―We believe that repeated insertion of a ‗monitor 
option‘ into the Guidelines‘ Manual suggests that the Commission sees the practice as some 
kind of ‗best‘ or common practice that judges should consider routinely, rather than the 
nuclear option that most folks who‘ve ever worked in a monitor situation perceive it to 
be.‖); Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, U.S. Sentencing Commission Amends Requirements 
for an Effective Compliance and Ethics Program (Apr. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/USSentencingCommissionAmendsRequire
mentsForEffectiveComplianceEthicsProgram.aspx (―As for the second component (steps to 
prevent future similar criminal conduct), the Commission‘s original version of the 
amendment would have stated that ‗[t]he organization may take the additional step of 
retaining an independent monitor to ensure adequate assessment and implementation of the 
modifications‘ to the compliance program.  The reference to monitors drew criticism for 
appearing to endorse and encourage a tool that rarely is necessary or appropriate.‖). 
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defines its terms.  Theoretically, the settlement agreements tailor each 
monitorship as is necessary to assuage the government‘s concerns and to 
help ensure compliance with the FCPA.  In reality, however, some basic 
parameters tend to frame FCPA settlement agreements.  The DOJ‘s 
Morford Memorandum, which was issued in 2008, has lent some 
standardization to the FCPA monitorship process by providing useful 
guidance for prosecutors on the selection and use of monitors. 
The Morford Memorandum explains that a monitor should be selected 
based on his or her ―merits.‖
124
  The selection process must ensure that 
(1) ―a highly qualified and respected person or entity‖ is selected ―based on 
suitability for the assignment and all of the circumstances,‖ (2) ―potential 
and actual conflicts of interest[]‖ are avoided, and (3) there is public 
confidence in the effectiveness of the monitorship.
125
  To ensure that 
conflicts of interest do not arise, prosecutors are not permitted to veto a 
monitor candidate unilaterally, but instead must create a standing or ad hoc 
committee in the DOJ ―component or office where the case originated to 
consider monitor candidates.‖
126
  After the committee approves of a 
monitor candidate, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General must also 
approve the monitor.
127
 
To garner public confidence in the monitorship, the government 
should decline to accept a monitor if he or she has ―an interest in, or 
relationship with, the corporation or its employees, officers or directors that 
would cause a reasonable person to question the monitor‘s impartiality.‖
128
  
In addition, the corporation must agree not to employ or become affiliated 
with the monitor for at least one year from the date the monitorship is 
terminated. 
Once a monitor is selected, the following principles must be followed: 
A monitor‘s primary responsibility should be to assess and 
monitor a corporation‘s compliance with those terms of the 
agreement that are specifically designed to address and reduce 
the risk of recurrence of the corporation‘s misconduct, including, 
in most cases, evaluating (and where appropriate proposing) 
internal controls and corporate ethics and compliance programs. 
. . . . 
In carrying out his or her duties, a monitor will often need to 
 
 124. Morford Memo, supra note 28, at 3. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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understand the full scope of the corporation‘s misconduct 
covered by the agreement, but the monitor‘s responsibilities 
should be no broader than necessary to address and reduce the 
risk of recurrence of the corporation‘s misconduct.
129
 
The Morford Memorandum, which addresses all compliance 
monitorships, not just those that involve FCPA enforcement, provides 
intentionally ―flexible‖ guidelines.
130
  This reflects the reality that 
monitorships will differ ―[g]iven the varying facts and circumstances of 
each case.‖
131
  The past six years of FCPA settlements exemplify this 
anticipated diversity in the terms of monitorships.  Of the thirty companies 
that received monitors in this time period as a result of an FCPA violation, 
surprisingly, no two formed settlement agreements with the government 
that had identical monitorship parameters.  Terms vary as to the length of 
the monitorship, the process of selecting the monitor, the role of the 
monitor, and the scope of review.  The agreements demonstrate that the 
requirements for FCPA compliance monitorship continue to evolve and 
that corporations have some flexibility in negotiating for terms that best fit 
their situations. 
A. Length of Monitorship 
The length of FCPA monitorships has varied greatly, lasting anywhere 
from a few months to four years.  Over time, the length of monitorships has 
generally increased; the most common monitorship length is three years.  
Between 2004 and 2010, seventeen companies received three-year FCPA 
monitorships, six companies received monitorships of less than one year, 
two companies had monitorships of eighteen months, and two companies 
had a two-year monitorship. 
In December 2008, the government settled with Siemens and required 
a four-year monitorship—the first FCPA monitorship of its kind.
132
  The 
agreement, however, contained a clause allowing the length of the 
monitorship to be decreased or increased depending on the results of 
periodic reports to the government.  This flexibility in duration was also a 
first, and settlement agreements entered into after the Siemens agreement 
included language allowing the monitorship‘s timeframe to be decreased or 
increased if needed.  The upside to this greater flexibility, of course, is the 
opportunity for the company to fix problems and exit the monitorship as 
soon as possible.  Shortening the duration of the monitorship has the 
 
 129. Id. at 5-6. 
 130. Id. at 2. 
 131. Id. 
 132. The change starting with Siemens may be attributable to the apparent failures of the 
Aibel monitorship, which is discussed below. 
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potential of providing the company with large cost savings.  If, however, 
the government determined that the monitor had not yet met with enough 
success, the company could be doomed to an expensive, seemingly never-
ending monitorship. 
A company negotiating a settlement agreement that requires retaining 
a monitor should strongly consider whether it wants language similar to 
that found in the Siemens agreement.  It may be worthwhile to push for a 
term that includes the ability to curtail the monitorship‘s duration, without 
the corresponding opportunity to increase its length. 
B. Number of Reports 
The number of reports an FCPA monitor must provide to the 
government varies and is usually tied to the length of the monitorship.  
Most settlement agreements require an initial report in the monitorship‘s 
first year and annual follow-up reports.  In fact, there were only two 
exceptions to this pattern between 2004 and 2010:  Micrus and Diagnostic 
Products Corporation entered into settlement agreements that mandated 
biannual reports to the government, resulting in a total of six reports over 
three years.  These two minor exceptions aside, the duration of the FCPA 
monitorship generally determines the number of reports. 
If the length of the monitorship increases or decreases based on 
language similar to that found in the Siemens agreement, then the number 
of required reports will also change.  In addition to formal reports, the 
Siemens agreement included language requiring informal meetings among 
the company, monitor, and government to ensure that the monitorship is 
progressing in a positive and productive manner.  This extra ―check‖ on the 
monitorship is valuable, and companies and regulators alike should 
strongly consider including it in settlement agreements. 
C. Choosing a Monitor 
As is discussed in the Morford Memorandum, the selection of a 
monitor requires cooperation between the government and the company.  
Only four FCPA settlement agreements formed between 2004 and 2010 
specified who the monitor would be:  Paradigm BV, Ingersoll-Rand, 
Siemens, and Daimler.
133
  If the agreement does not provide the monitor‘s 
 
 133. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5 (specifying that Louis J. Freeh 
was proposed by Daimler and approved by the DOJ to serve as monitor); Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Italiana SpA, No. 1:07cr00294, 
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identity, it will require the company to obtain government approval of the 
company‘s chosen candidates—usually within sixty days of the 
agreement‘s finalization. 
This practice, however, was recently lambasted by the district court 
judge overseeing the guilty plea of Innospec.
134
  She expressed concern that 
the monitor was not specified in the agreement.
135
  And although she 
ultimately accepted the plea, the judge informed the government that she 
wanted to review the person selected as monitor, as well as the monitor‘s 
work plan.
136
  The judge‘s reaction was unexpected, and it is unclear what 
effect this event may have on future monitorship agreements.
137
  To date, 
FCPA settlement agreements have only required a monitor‘s selection and 
 
(D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/ 
ingersollrand-deferred-agree.pdf [hereinafter Ingersoll-Rand Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement] (specifying that Jeffrey M. Kaplan was retained as an outside consultant to 
review the compliance program of Ingersoll and its subsidiaries); Letter from Steven A. 
Tyrrell et al., Dep‘t of Justice, to Scott W. Muller and Angela T. Burgess, Davis Polk & 
Wardwell  (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/ siemens.pdf 
(specifying that Dr. Theo Waigel would serve as an independent monitor); Letter from 
Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Dep‘t of Justice, to Saul M. Pilchen, Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom LLP, at app. C (Sept. 21, 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/ 
hearings/pdf/deferredprosecution/Paradigm070921.pdf [hereinafter Paradigm Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement] (specifying that the law firm of Skadden Arps Slate Meagher and 
Flom LLP was retained as outside compliance counsel).. 
 134. See Christopher M. Matthews, Judge Blasts Compliance Monitors at Innospec Plea 
Hearing, MAIN JUSTICE, Mar. 18, 2010 available at http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/03/ 
18/innospec-pleads-guilty-fcpa-charges/ (discussing U.S. District Judge Ellen Segal 
Huvelle‘s dissatisfaction with the Innospec agreement and critique of independent 
compliance monitors in general). 
 135. See id. (―Huvelle was disturbed that the monitor was not named in the plea 
agreement . . . ‗I want to know how this is going to work, I have an obligation to the public 
to find out,‘ she said.‖). 
 136. Id. 
 137. The judge‘s reaction may reflect the very public controversy and ensuing criticism 
surrounding the (non-FCPA) monitorship of former Attorney General John Ashcroft, whose 
engagement, reportedly worth up to $52 million, resulted from a no-bid referral from a 
former colleague at the Department of Justice.  See Transparency and Integrity in Corporate 
Marketing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. 
Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Rep. Steve Cohen) available 
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-64_53640.PDF (―One notorious 
example, which we explored in our previous hearings, was the Zimmer case.  That is when 
Caesar‘s wife was very disturbed.  U.S. Attorney then, now governor-to-be Christopher 
Christie, selected former Attorney General John Ashcroft to serve as a corporate monitor, 
for which Mr. Ashcroft collected a fee of up to or in the neighborhood of or resembling or 
within the margin of error of $52 million.  A tidy sum, it could pay for some drycleaning for 
Mrs. Caesar‘s robes.‖); Nina Totenberg, House Panel Questions Ashcroft on No-Bid 
Contract, NPR: MORNING EDITION, Mar. 12, 2008, available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88132206&ft=1&f=1006 (discussing 
the House Judiciary Committee‘s questioning of former Attorney General John Ashcroft 
about a no-bid contract that his consulting firm received from a former colleague in the 
Justice Department). 
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work plan to be approved by the government; they have not included 
language mandating court approval as well.  Adding a layer of judicial 
scrutiny could increase costs, as the monitor and the company would need 
to make court appearances and respond to the judge‘s requests, which 
would most likely be more unpredictable than those of the regulators, who 
regularly handle FCPA cases.  On the other hand, courts could theoretically 
serve as a check on the government and even an out-of-control monitor. 
Other factors related to the selection of monitors are much less 
standardized and include who selects the monitor and how the monitor is 
ultimately chosen, whether the same person serves as the monitor for 
related DOJ and SEC settlements, and how to handle a dispute between the 
monitor and the company.  Typically, the government has allowed 
companies to identify and propose monitorship candidates.  In some 
agreements, the company must submit a pool of acceptable candidates, 
leaving the government to select the monitor from that pool or request 
additional candidates.
138
 In other instances, the government allowed the 
company to continue presenting prospective monitors to the government 
until agreement on a mutually acceptable candidate.
139
  Occasionally, the 
government selected the monitor for the company, but the Morford 
Memorandum has presumably put an end to that practice.
140
  The DOJ 
recently exercised its authority to reject a monitor picked by a corporation.  
As discussed above, in March 2010, BAES entered into a settlement 
agreement with the DOJ that required the imposition of a monitor.
141
  
 
 138. E.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root, LLC, No. H-09-
071, (S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 
cases/docs/kbr-plea-agree.pdf [hereinafter Kellogg Brown & Root Plea Agreement]. 
 139. E.g., Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell, Chief, Fraud Section, Dep‘t of Justice, to 
Gregory S. Bruch, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP., at app. C (June 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/FaroAgreement.pdf.  It appears to have 
taken Faro and the DOJ nearly two years to agree on a monitor.  Mike Koehler, Faro’s 
Monitor – Late and Expensive, FCPA Professor Blog (Dec. 27, 2010, 5:21 AM), available 
at http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2010/12/faros-monitor-late-and-expensive.html. 
 140. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 10, United States v. York Int‘l Corp., 
No. 07-CR-00253 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ 
fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/ 10-15-07york-agree.pdf [hereinafter York Int‘l Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement] (allowing the DOJ to choose the monitor if the DOJ and company could not 
decide on a mutually agreeable monitor within thirty days); Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement at 12, United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., No. 07-CR-130 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 
2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/04-11-
07bakerhughes-prosecution.pdf [hereinafter Baker Hughes Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement] (allowing the DOJ to choose the monitor if the DOJ and company could not 
decide on a mutually agreeable monitor within thirty days). 
 141. Christopher M. Matthews, Justice Department Opposed BAE Monitor Picks, MAIN 
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Under the terms of the agreement, BAES had ninety days in which to hire a 
monitor, but the DOJ rejected the proposed candidates because they 
―appeared to lack experience establishing or monitoring the effectiveness 
of compliance programs,‖ in addition to other perceived weaknesses.
142
  
Regardless of the process involved, the government may veto the chosen 
monitor, and the court may, as is evidenced by the agreement with 
Innospec, also weigh in on the selection.
143
 
Frequently, both the SEC and the DOJ have required the imposition of 
a monitor for related FCPA conduct.  The agreements with each agency, 
however, typically employ different language to impose the requirement.  
Strikingly, few FCPA settlement agreements include language requiring 
that the monitor be the same individual for both the DOJ and SEC 
settlements.  In fact, only two companies entered into agreements between 
2004 and 2010 that indicate that the DOJ and SEC are to have the same 
monitor:  Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. (―Schnitzer Steel‖) and InVision.  
It is possible that, in the absence of such of provision, the SEC and DOJ 
may not agree on a prospective monitor.  But because the agencies usually 
coordinate so closely on FCPA enforcement, this is unlikely.
144
 
One wrinkle in FCPA monitor selection has been the increasing 
frequency with which the government imposes monitors on non-U.S. 
offenders.  Indeed, FCPA settlements with non-U.S.-based multinational 
corporations implicate a range of thorny conflict of law questions.  The 
FCPA settlement with Technip, for instance, mandates that the monitor be 
a French citizen, as French criminal law prohibits a foreign investigation in 
France.
145
  Similarly, Alcatel-Lucent, which publicly announced its pending 
FCPA settlement, agreed with the U.S. government that the monitor must 
 
JUSTICE, June 3, 2010, available at http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/06/03/justice-
department-opposed-bae-monitor-picks/print/#comments_controls. 
 142. Id.  Although BAES‘s alleged conduct included actions that could be deemed 
violative of the FCPA, the company did not technically plead guilty to violations of the 
FCPA. 
 143. Letter from Kathleen M. Hamann, Dep‘t of Justice, to Laurence Urgenson, Kirkland 
& Ellis LLP 8 (Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/b62/ 
b621ad75bdd7f13a615b7d90a994e415.pdf?i=0b2e9227a0b54ac8bd3942b083fa9605. 
 144. The two agencies did, however, diverge in handling the recent FCPA enforcement 
actions against Alliance One International.  The DOJ filed charges in the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia; the SEC pursued the case in federal court in Washington, 
D.C.  Press Release, Dep‘t of Justice, Alliance One International Inc. and Universal 
Corporation Resolve Related FCPA Matters Involving Bribes Paid to Foreign Government 
Officials (Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-crm-
903.html; Complaint, SEC v. Alliance One International Inc., Case No. 1:1O-cv-01319 
(D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/ 
comp21618-alliance-one.pdf.  This means that different judges will oversee the company‘s 
monitorship. 
 145. Technip Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at Attachment D. 
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be French.
146
  Finally, the Siemens FCPA settlement explicitly provides for 
a German monitor, Dr. Theo Waigel, former German Minister of Finance, 
supported by independent U.S. counsel.
147
  In contrast, other Europe-based 
multinationals, like Daimler and Statoil ASA (―Statoil‖), opted for U.S.-
based monitors.
148
 
Finally, FCPA settlement agreements differ in the procedures outlined 
for resolving disputes between the company and the monitor regarding the 
monitor‘s recommendations to the company for compliance program 
improvement.  Ten FCPA settlement agreements formed between 2004 and 
2010 required the company to submit to the monitor‘s decision if the 
company and monitor are unable to reach an agreement within a specified 
amount of time.  This language leaves the company at the mercy of the 
monitor.  Four companies were required to notify the government of the 
dispute without having a discussion of how the dispute would be resolved.  
Ten companies, nine of which were Siemens and the eight cases requiring 
monitors that settled after Siemens, specified that the government would 
settle disputes between the company and monitor.  One company was 
required to consult France‘s Central Service for the Prevention of 
Corruption (―SCPC‖), a department attached to the French Ministry of 
Justice.149  If after consultation with the SCPC, the company and monitor 
failed to reach agreement, the monitor was required to take into 
consideration the view of the SCPC and make the ultimate decision as to 
whether the company should adopt the monitor‘s recommendation.   
Language similar to that found in the Siemens agreement is the most 
beneficial to the company.  It allows the company to present alternatives to 
the monitor‘s recommendations and ensures that the monitor is held 
accountable by the government.  It also enhances the probability that the 
recommendations will ultimately serve the government‘s goals.  The DOJ 
 
 146. Alcatel-Lucent Consolidated Financial Statements at December 31, 2009, at 114 
(Nov. 2, 2010), available at http://www1.alcatel-lucent.com/4q2009/pdf/Consolidated-
Financial-Statements-2009-GB11_feb10.pdf. 
 147. Letter from Steven A. Tyrrell et al., Dep‘t of Justice, to Scott W. Muller and Angela 
T. Burgess, Davis Polk & Wardwell (Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens.pdf. 
 148. Daimler retained former FBI Director, Judge Louis Freeh; Statoil selected F. Joseph 
Warin. Daimler Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5, at 10; Statoil, Annual 
Report (Form 20-F) (Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://www.statoil.com/ 
AnnualReport2009/en/Sustainability/Society/EthicsAndTransparency/Pages/HortonCaseClo
sedContinuedFocusOnEthicsAndAnti-Corruption.aspx. 
 149. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Technip, No. H-10-439, (D.D.C.  
June 28, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/06-28- 
10-technip-agreement.pdf [hereinafter Technip Deferred Prosecution Agreement]. 
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recently issued additional guidance to prosecutors via the Grindler 
Memorandum regarding the drafting of settlement agreements, stating that 
―an agreement should explain what role the Department could play in 
resolving any disputes between the monitor and the corporation, given the 
facts and circumstances of the case.‖
150
  Thus, future FCPA settlement 
agreements should resemble the Siemens agreement in this respect. 
D. Attorney-Client Privilege 
Companies required to retain monitors today typically agree not to 
enter into an attorney-client relationship with the monitor.  This was not 
always the case.  Some earlier agreements did not strictly prohibit the 
company from forming an attorney-client relationship with the monitor, but 
any attorney-client privilege had to be waived with respect to the agency 
with which the company settled.
151
  Today, however, the vast majority of 
agreements expressly forestall the creation of an attorney-client 
relationship.
152
  The most recent agreements simply state that there is no 
such relationship.
153
  Because this language is so explicit, companies may 
find it extremely difficult to assert attorney-client privilege if an outside 
party attempts to gain access to information communicated by the company 
to the monitor. 
Regardless of the language used, the lack of an attorney-client 
relationship between the monitor and the company can pose a significant 
risk of further legal exposure for the company.  Because the monitor is 
independent, actively reviews the company‘s practices, and reports to the 
 
 150. Memorandum from Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of 
Department Components United States Attorneys, on Additional Guidance on the Use of 
Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with 
Corporations (May 25, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/dag-memo-guidance-
monitors.html. 
 151. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7, United States v. Monsanto Co., 
1:05-cr-00008 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/monsantoagreement.pdf [hereinafter 
Monsanto Deferred Prosecution Agreement] (―To the extent that . . . the attorney-client 
privilege could conceivably be applicable, it shall be a condition of that retention that 
Monsanto Company shall waive . . . .‖). 
 152. The Statoil agreement, however, acknowledged that the monitor would maintain the 
company‘s trade secrets and other confidential information in conformity with Norwegian 
law.  Deferred Prosecution Agreement at ¶ 12, United States v. Statoil, ASA, No. 06-cr-
00960 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Statoil Deferred Prosecution Agreement], 
available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall07/materials/StatoilDeferredProsecution 
Agreement.pdf. 
 153. See, e.g., Kellogg Brown & Root Plea Agreement, supra note 138; Plea Agreement, 
United States v. Control Components, Inc., SA CR No. 09-162 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2009) 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/control-components.html 
[hereinafter Control Components Plea Agreement]. 
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government, the monitor might discover and reveal previously undisclosed 
wrongdoing.  Any such wrongdoing may or may not be FCPA related, but 
if found by a monitor, it can lead to further scrutiny by the government and 
additional penalties.  For example, in May 2008, Willbros Group, Inc. 
(―Willbros‖) entered into FCPA settlement agreements with the DOJ and 
SEC.
154
  On May 20, 2010, Willbros filed an 8-K with the SEC, which 
stated that its monitor‘s recent report to the DOJ 
sets out for the DOJ‘s review the monitor‘s findings relating to 
incidents that came to the monitor‘s attention during the course 
of his review which he found to be significant, as well as 
recommendations to address these incidents.  We and the monitor 
have met separately with the DOJ concerning certain of these 
incidents.  The monitor, in his report, did not conclude whether 
any of these incidents or any other matters constituted a violation 
of the FCPA.  We do not believe that any of these incidents or 
matters constituted a violation of the FCPA based on our own 
investigations of the incidents and matters raised in the report.  
Notwithstanding our assessment, the DOJ could perform further 
investigation at its discretion of any incident or matter raised by 
the report.
155
 
The implications of this lack of attorney-client privilege and how 
companies may address it are discussed further in Part V.D. 
E. Conflict of Interest 
The monitor is supposed to perform an independent review of the 
company‘s FCPA compliance policy and procedures.  One of the reasons 
that FCPA settlement agreements forbid an attorney-client relationship is 
that it could undermine the monitor‘s independence.  Similarly, it is 
important that the company not retain the monitor as legal counsel 
immediately after the monitorship concludes.  Even if doing so would not 
actually undermine the monitor‘s independence during the course of the 
monitorship, the public‘s perception of the effectiveness of monitors could 
be diminished if companies routinely hired monitors upon their 
monitorships‘ conclusion.  Because of this, almost every company entering 
into an FCPA monitorship has been required to agree to a provision 
 
 154. Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 105. 
 155. Willbros Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 8-K), Exhibit 99.2: Risk Factors (May 
20, 2010). 
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prohibiting it from affiliating with or hiring a monitor for one or two years 
after the monitorship term expires.  Only five companies entered into 
agreements without this cooling-off-period language between 2004 and 
2010.  The current trend is for the recusal period to last for one year.
156
 
F. Language Describing Monitor’s Responsibility 
FCPA monitors typically develop a work plan and then issue 
recommendations to the company throughout the course of executing that 
plan.  The language used in describing the monitor‘s responsibilities 
regarding the recommendations he or she must issue varies only slightly 
from agreement to agreement, but those minor variations can sometimes 
have significance.  The following represents the types of language 
contained in agreements.  Recommendations that 
are ―reasonably designed‖ to achieve; 
will ―ensure‖; 
are ―reasonably designed to ensure‖; 
are ―necessary and appropriate‖ to achieve; 
are ―appropriately designed and implemented to ensure‖; or 
are ―appropriately designed to accomplish‖ FCPA compliance.
157
   
Note that the language choice leads to very different base-line 
standards for the monitor‘s recommendations.  Recommendations that are 
―reasonably designed‖ to achieve FCPA compliance will likely be less 
severe than those that are given to ―ensure‖ compliance.  ―Ensuring‖ 
compliance is an elevated standard and may result in the company being 
forced to adhere to recommendations that will severely burden aspects of 
the company‘s business.  Companies should carefully negotiate this type of 
 
 156. See, e.g., Plea Agreement at app. C, ¶ 3, United States v. Universal Leaf Tabacos 
Ltda., No. 3:10-cr-225 (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/universal-leaf/08-06-10universal-leaf- 
sentencing-memo.pdf (―The Company agrees that it will not employ or be affiliated with the 
Monitor for a period of not less than one year from the date the Monitor's work has 
ended.‖); Letter from Denis J. McInerney, Dep‘t of Justice, to Edward J. Fuhrapp, Hunton 
and Williams LLP. C, ¶ 4 (Aug. 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/08-06-10alliance-one-npa.pdf 
(―Alliance agrees that it will not employ or be affiliated with the Monitor for a period of not 
less than one year from the date the Monitor's work has ended.‖). 
 157. See, e.g., Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 105; Agreement 
between Dep‘t of Justice and Micrus (Feb. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/docs/02-28-05micrus-agree.pdf; Cease-
and-Desist Order, Westinghouse Brake Tech. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 57333, 
Accounting And Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2785 (Feb. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/34-57333.pdf; Ingersoll-Rand Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 133; Monsanto Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra 
note 151. 
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language to make sure reasonable expectations are established. 
G. Differences in Monitorship Requirements in DOJ and SEC Settlements 
If a company is settling with both the DOJ and SEC, it will have to 
negotiate independently with each agency.  In the past, this circumstance 
has often resulted in two settlement agreements that include different 
requirements.  For example, Baker Hughes, Inc. (―Baker Hughes‖) entered 
into a DPA with the DOJ and submitted to the entry of a Final Judgment to 
settle with the SEC.
158
  The DPA and SEC Final Judgment, however, risked 
conflicts for the company.  The DPA specified the length of the 
monitorship as thirty-six months, but the SEC agreement did not include 
this information.
159
  The DOJ required three reports—one initial review 
within 120 days of the monitor‘s retention, a follow-up review one year 
after the initial review, and another follow-up review a year from the first 
follow-up.
160
  The SEC required one report—150 days after the monitor‘s 
retention.
161
  The DPA stated that if the DOJ and Baker Hughes could not 
agree upon a monitor within thirty days, the DOJ ―in its sole discretion‖ 
would select the monitor.  This did not, however, guarantee that the DOJ‘s 
choice would be acceptable to the SEC, which required its own approval of 
the monitor.
162
  The wording of these agreements could have resulted in 
Baker Hughes having to retain two monitors.  Even a single monitor may 
have needed to issue two separate work plans. 
This is in stark contrast to the FCPA settlements that Schnitzer Steel 
entered into with the DOJ and SEC.
163
  Unlike most FCPA agreements 
negotiated with multiple agencies, Schnitzer Steel‘s agreements closely 
mirror each other.  The DPA specified that the Monitor should be the same 
 
 158. Baker Hughes Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 140; Final Judgment, 
SEC v. Baker Hughes Inc., No. H-07-1408 (S.D. Tex. May 1, 2007) [hereinafter Baker 
Hughes Final Judgment]. 
 159. Baker Hughes Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 140, at 12. 
 160. Id. at 15-17. 
 161. Baker Hughes Final Judgment, supra note 158, at 7. 
 162. Id. at 5. 
 163. Cease-and-Desist Order, Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 
54606, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2493 (Oct. 16, 2006), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54606.pdf [hereinafter Schnitzer Steel 
Cease-and-Desist Order]; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc. 
(Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912603/ 
000107261306002130/exh10-1_14656.htm [hereinafter Schnitzer Steel Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement]. 
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person appointed pursuant to an agreement with the SEC.
164
  Both the DPA 
and SEC Order (1) stated that the monitor‘s reports should go to both 
agencies,
165
 (2) required Schnitzer Steel to retain a monitor for thirty-six 
months,
166
 (3) required three reports from the monitor,
167
 (4) explained that 
the monitor was to assess and make recommendations ―reasonably 
designed to improve Schnitzer Steel‘s programs, policies, and procedures 
for ensuring compliance with the FCPA‖ and other applicable laws,
168
 and 
(5) dictated that the company could not hire the monitor for two years after 
it completed its work under the DPA and SEC Order.
169
 
H. Outliers 
Several FCPA settlement agreements formed between 2004 and 2010 
fall outside the norm.  Two, in particular, are worth highlighting.  In 
September 2007, Paradigm BV (―Paradigm‖) entered into an NPA with the 
DOJ.
170
  The NPA mandated probably the least onerous monitorship terms 
ever imposed by an FCPA settlement.  It specifically named the 
compliance monitor—who, ironically, was the company‘s defense 
counsel—but did not include typical FCPA monitorship language.
171
  In 
fact, the text outlining Paradigm‘s responsibilities under the monitorship 
fill only about half of a sheet of paper.
172
  This stands in contrast to other 
FCPA agreements that expend multiple pages to define the imposed 
monitorship.  The length of the monitorship was eighteen months—also 
unusual—and the agreement did not explicitly specify the requirements for 
reporting to the DOJ.
173
  The only relevant term similar to the standard 
FCPA settlement agreement was the requirement that the monitor 
―[r]ecommend, where necessary and appropriate, enhancements to 
Paradigm‘s compliance code, policies and procedures as they relate to the 
FCPA.‖
174
 
The Aibel Group‘s FCPA settlement represents another outlier.  The 
company entered a guilty plea after it failed to adhere to the terms of its 
DPA.
175
  The DPA required Aibel to (1) establish a Compliance Committee 
 
 164. Schnitzer Steel Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 163, at 9. 
 165. Id. at 12; Schnitzer Steel Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 163, at 6. 
 166. Schnitzer Steel Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 163, at 3, 5. 
 167. Id. at 6-7, 11. 
 168. Id. at 6, 11-12. 
 169. Id. at 8, 17. 
 170. Paradigm Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 133. 
 171. Id. at app. C. 
 172. Id. at 2. 
 173. Id. at 1. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Aibel Group Ltd., No. CR H-07-005 (S.D. 
Tex. 2008), available at http://www.fcpaenforcement.com/documents/document_detail.asp 
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of its Board of Directors, (2) engage outside compliance counsel to monitor 
its duties and obligations under the DPA, and (3) establish and effectively 
implement a compliance program with respect to the FCPA.
176
  The guilty 
plea noted that Aibel ―committed substantial time, personnel, and resources 
to meeting the obligations of the DPA.
177
  Despite that fact, [Aibel] failed to 
meet its obligations.‖
178
 Aibel pleaded guilty and paid a $4.2 million fine,
179
 
which, from a cost perspective, is probably a better deal than living with a 
monitor for another year.  On its own, the facts surrounding this plea would 
qualify Aibel Group as a company falling outside the typical route of 
companies required to implement monitorships.  But what is arguably even 
more interesting is the changes in subsequent agreements after Aibel‘s 
guilty plea. 
The companies that entered into settlement agreements after Aibel 
pleaded guilty had strikingly different language in their agreements.  First, 
the agreements changed the handling of disputes between the company and 
the monitor regarding the monitor‘s recommendations.  Instead of deferring 
to the monitor, the disputes are now referred to the appropriate agency‘s 
staff, and the agency makes the determination as to whether the company 
should abide by the monitor‘s recommendation.  Further, pending the 
agency‘s determination, the company is no longer required to implement 
any contested recommendations.  In addition, the agreements contain a 
provision requiring the company and the agency to meet at least annually to 
discuss the monitorship and any suggestions, comments, or improvements 
the company may wish to propose.  These changes may indicate that the 
relationship between Aibel and its monitor became untenable. 
IV. WHAT AN EFFECTIVE FCPA MONITORSHIP LOOKS LIKE 
Having described the nature of FCPA monitorships and examined how 
they have varied, the remainder of this article turns to a discussion of how 
they can work better.  Volumes have been written on virtually all 
professional activities that lawyers may undertake.  Indeed, many 
practitioners can offer lengthy advice on what an effective deposition, oral 
argument, brief, or internal investigation looks like.  This is certainly true 
with regard to FCPA enforcement generally and for designing effective 
 
?ID=5488&PAGE=2. 
 176. Id. at 10. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 9. 
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compliance programs to avoid FCPA violations.  There is, however, very 
little guidance on how to conduct an effective monitorship. 
One only needs to look at the very public questioning of now-Deputy 
Attorney General Jim Cole‘s performance as AIG compliance monitor to 
see that even extremely knowledgeable commentators may not always have 
a clear view of the monitor‘s role.
180
  The benchmark for any monitor‘s 
success is fulfilling the terms of the applicable settlement agreements.  And 
yet, in that particular case, no critics actually attempted to measure 
Mr. Cole‘s performance against his mandate.  As the Morford 
Memorandum clearly states, ―[a] monitor‘s primary responsibility should 
be to assess and monitor a corporation‘s compliance with those terms of the 
[settlement] agreement that are specifically designed to address and reduce 
the risk of recurrence of the corporation‘s misconduct . . . .‖
181
  In other 
words, Mr. Cole‘s success or failure turns on meeting the four corners of 
the settlement agreement between AIG and the government, not whether 
AIG subsequently had financial troubles. 
This is also true of FCPA monitorships.  Success or failure hinges on 
fulfilling the monitor‘s mandate.  Yet, there are certainly better and worse 
ways to approach the core tasks that generally constitute the FCPA 
monitorship.  As shown above, the mandates for FCPA monitorships are 
sufficiently similar such that practitioners in this field can begin to sketch 
out some best practices.  This section attempts to start that conversation. 
A.  The Settlement Agreements Constitute the Monitor’s Bible 
The cardinal rule for any monitor is that he or she must, at all times, 
abide by the terms of the agreements with the DOJ and SEC.  As it is the 
deal for which the company bargained, it is incumbent upon all actors to 
honor this contract and for the monitor to appreciate that his or her very 
existence is a function of the settlements.  The settlement agreements 
dictate many of the key components of the specific FCPA monitorship:  the 
length of the monitorship, when and for how long the monitor will conduct 
reviews, any certifications that a monitor may have to make, the nature and 
general structure of fieldwork, and any work product that the monitor must 
submit to the government and the company. 
In short, the settlement agreements are the monitor‘s bible.  But, as 
with biblical texts, exegeses can differ, and the monitor will certainly at 
 
 180. See, e.g., Sue Reisinger, It’s Broken: AIG’s Federal Monitor Failed to Curtail Bad 
Behavior. Is it Time to Reexamine the Program?, CORPORATE COUNSEL (July 1, 2009), 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202431504805 (discussing 
the challenges faced by AIG‘s DOJ-imposed monitor and questioning the value of the 
monitor program in light of its massive failure). 
 181. Morford Memo, supra note 28, at 5. 
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times disagree with the company.  Currently, FCPA settlements normally 
provide that any disputes are resolved by the government,
182
 but monitors 
and companies alike should avoid resorting to this.  Successful 
monitorships run on trust and cooperation.  The minute a dispute is 
appealed to the SEC or DOJ, the relationship may be irrevocably damaged.  
Monitors and companies should therefore try to iron out any differences 
and align their understandings of the monitorship mandate well in advance 
of any fieldwork or report writing. 
The best place to do this is in the monitor‘s work plan.  Just as a legal 
opinion starts with a statute and builds out from the text, so too does an 
effective work plan clearly construct the monitor‘s reasoning for the 
company, based on the settlement.  To avoid squabbles in front of the 
regulators, the monitor should allow the company to review and comment 
on the draft work plan to be sure that both sides understand how the 
monitor interprets his or her mandate.  Once both sides agree, the mandate 
discussion in the work plan can serve as a gloss on the settlement 
agreement to be applied in subsequent years of the monitorship. 
One difficulty that the company and the monitor may face during 
these early goings is that the monitor only has the text of the settlement 
agreements to interpret.  The company, on the other hand, will inevitably 
have the thrust and parry of the lengthy negotiations coloring its view of 
the ultimate agreements.  Despite protestations from the company, the 
monitor cannot allow any parol evidence from the negotiations to influence 
his or her view of the settlement agreements.  It is, after all, unfair to allow 
the company to change the monitor‘s interpretation without similar 
evidence from the government.  If, however, the government and the 
company agree that a drafting error obscures the true intention behind the 
settlement agreements, the monitor could adjust his or her approach.  The 
alteration of a monitorship based on settlement agreements approved by a 
court would also require judicial sign-off, of course. 
The terms of the settlement agreement not only empower monitors.  
They also serve to protect the company from the monitor‘s overreach.  For 
instance, the time period provided for the initial and follow-up reviews 
should limit any impulses that the monitor may have to conduct a year-
round review.  Further, FCPA settlements sometimes provide explicitly that 
the monitor need not reinvestigate the old conduct that led to the 
settlement.
183
  This restricts the monitor and his or her team to testing and 
 
 182. See, e.g., Control Components Plea Agreement, supra note 153; Kellogg Brown & 
Root Plea Agreement, supra note 138. 
 183. See, e.g., Letter from Paul E. Pelletier, Dep‘t of Justice, to Lawrence Bryne, 
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evaluating, not investigating.  The company and the monitor should both 
rigorously adhere to the time commitments in the settlement document and 
avoid mission creep in the duties of the monitor. 
B. The Monitor’s Work Must Reflect Knowledge of the Business 
It is easy for a monitor to focus on a company‘s compliance program 
to the exclusion of all else.  The compliance program is, after all, the 
monitor‘s core concern.  The monitor will almost certainly have a strong 
background in the area of internal compliance programs, so he or she will 
focus like a laser on the program and how it can be improved.  Comparing 
the company‘s compliance program to past programs the monitor has 
worked with or designed is relatively straightforward.  More challenging, 
however, is understanding the business that the controls seek to safeguard.  
Although obtaining such an understanding can be tedious and difficult, it is 
essential. 
There are a number of reasons why knowledge of the business is so 
important.  First, the monitor cannot begin to develop an initial risk profile 
for the company if he or she fails to learn the business.  The monitor‘s 
fieldwork should reflect the risks that attend the business.  The intersection 
of internal controls and difficult business environments that potentially 
expose the company to corruption should consume much of the 
monitorship team‘s initial focus.  Without understanding the business, 
developing this focus is virtually impossible.  Second, the monitor cannot 
effectively evaluate the controls unless he or she knows how they work 
with the business.  Indeed, the company may boast controls that function 
perfectly but fail to respond fully to the actual risks faced by the business.  
Without understanding the company‘s business, the monitor will never 
detect this problem. 
Finally, an understanding of the business is essential for crafting 
 
Pedersen & Houpt (Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/ 
documents/03-01-10bae-plea-%20agreement.pdf (―In order to conduct an effective initial 
review of the Anti-bribery and Export Control Policies and Procedures, the Monitor's initial 
work plan shall include such steps as are reasonably necessary to develop an understanding 
of the facts and circumstances surrounding any violations that may have occurred, but the 
parties do not intend that the Monitor will conduct his or her own inquiry into those 
historical events.‖); see also Siemens Final Judgment, supra note 94, at 8 (―The Monitor‘s 
work plan for the initial review shall include such steps as are reasonably necessary to 
conduct an effective initial review in accordance with the Mandate, including by developing 
an understanding, to the extent the Monitor deems appropriate, of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding any violations that may have occurred before the entry of the 
Final Judgment, but in developing such understanding the Monitor is to rely to the extent 
possible on available information and documents provided by Siemens, and it is not 
intended that the Monitor will conduct his or her own inquiry into those historical events.‖) 
(emphasis added)). 
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workable recommendations.  During the course of the monitorship, the 
monitor and his or her team will develop an in-depth understanding of the 
company‘s anti-corruption compliance program.  This is, of course, the 
team‘s main activity.  But without an appreciation for what the business 
does and how it does it, the monitor‘s work may consist of mere 
abstractions.  Often what appear to be ideal solutions flounder when judged 
against the realities of the business, existing controls, and management 
structures.  And anti-bribery controls should secure the business without 
fundamentally changing the way in which the business operates.  Indeed, 
substantive changes to the business to address a compliance problem, 
although sometimes necessary, are a last resort.  Whenever possible, any 
recommendations should work within the current size and structure of the 
company‘s existing compliance program, and the monitor‘s 
recommendations should be practical given the existing organization, its 
business model, and its culture. 
C. Detailed Work Plans Establish Transparency and Trust 
An effective work plan for an FCPA monitorship establishes in 
sufficient detail the contours of the monitor‘s work for that review period.  
Although the monitor should build in contingencies and must not slavishly 
follow the plan in the face of significantly changed circumstances, the 
monitor as much as possible should endeavor to execute the work plan as 
drafted.  The monitorship will already be traumatic for the company, and 
the uncertainty of a vague or unfocused work plan only will exacerbate 
institutional unease.  Further, it is important that the U.S. regulators have a 
clear view of what precisely the monitor will do.  A detailed work plan 
gives the government and company alike a chance to comment. 
Importantly, it is impossible to construct a detailed work plan for the 
initial monitorship review without some advance fieldwork.  The company 
may allow its key compliance and business employees to present to the 
monitor and his or her team pertinent information on the company and the 
compliance program.  By collecting and synthesizing such background 
information, the monitor can craft a work plan that appropriately targets the 
review and minimizes any dead ends or fruitless exercises.  The production 
of the detailed work plan following these information sessions then gives 
the company a chance to correct any misunderstandings or erroneous 
conclusions on the part of the monitor.  By hiding the ball from the 
company or the government with a vague work plan, the monitor may 
create more work, engender mistrust, and waste the company‘s resources. 
A sufficiently detailed work plan will address all of the core activities 
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that the monitor anticipates in that year.  It will typically include the 
following: 
 An overview of the monitor‘s role and objectives, rooted 
in the text of the settlement agreements, to ensure that all 
parties understand how the monitor views his or her 
mandate; 
 A proposed timeline for the monitorship based on the 
settlement agreements, including the date on which the 
monitor will submit a final report to the government and 
company; 
 A description of relevant compliance policies and 
procedures to evaluate; 
 A list of relevant documents to review; 
 A list of interviewees (company employees and others, 
like independent directors, external auditors, 
ombudsmen, and maybe even external vendors); 
 A list of proposed site visits (with proposed dates); and 
 A list of tests, studies, and analyses to conduct and how 
they will be conducted (including whether external or 
internal audit resources will be utilized). 
The more detailed the work plan is, the easier the process will be for 
the company, and the more useful it will be for the monitor as a map of the 
necessary work.  It is important, however, that the work plan genuinely 
reflect the tasks reasonably anticipated and that the monitor and his or her 
team strive to adhere to it at all times.  This includes meeting the proposed 
dates for completion of fieldwork and submission of reports to the 
company and the U.S. government.  Delays in producing annual reports 
may occur due to unanticipated events beyond the monitor‘s control.  But 
even under such trying circumstances, the monitor should try to produce 
the report on time.  Failure to do so can sap credibility from the 
monitorship, complicate the company‘s efforts to implement 
recommendations in a timely manner, and engender cynicism about the 
process. 
D. The Monitor’s Report Should Give the Parameters of the Review, 
Along With the Recommendations 
An FCPA compliance monitor‘s initial written report should detail the 
scope of the review, the monitor‘s evaluation of the company‘s compliance 
program, and any recommended enhancements to the compliance program.  
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In terms of scope, it is important that the company and the U.S. regulators 
understand not only the areas of the company (geographic and otherwise) 
on which the monitor concentrates, but the monitor‘s methodology as well.  
For instance, if the monitor wishes to engage an external auditor to assist 
him or her in conducting tests, studies, or analyses of key controls, he or 
she should use the work plan and then the report to explain the reason for 
this (and why it is necessary to use an external auditor, instead of in-house 
resources).  When detailing the monitor‘s evaluation, the report should 
catalogue all of the work that the monitor and his or her team performed 
and explain why this work was sufficient to gain the information needed to 
arrive at substantive conclusions.  In light of this, it is important that, 
during fieldwork, the monitor‘s team carefully documents all of its 
activities.  Among the review metrics that this portion of the initial report 
should provide are the number of employees interviewed and their 
corresponding functions and levels, the number and nature of the site visits 
conducted, and any past or external work relied upon to reach conclusions 
(like past compliance evaluations, anti-bribery risk assessments, or auditor 
reports).  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the initial report must 
provide the recommendations.  The recommendations are the only 
mandatory action items for the company that spring from the report.  
Therefore, in addition to vetting all recommendations fully in advance with 
the company (and allotting time in the work plan to do so), the monitor 
should present in the text of the report a sufficient evidentiary basis for 
each recommendation.  The monitor should seek the utmost clarity in 
explaining the contours of, rationale for, and evidence supporting a set of 
concrete, specific, and implementable recommendations. 
E. Cooperation Is Vital 
Finally, the monitor must strive whenever possible to have a 
cooperative—not an adversarial—relationship with the company.  The goal 
should be to add real value to the organization by enhancing its compliance 
program.  To achieve this goal, the monitor must ensure that the company, 
including the board of directors and senior management, supports the 
monitor‘s work.  In addition, the monitor should identify an individual or 
committee with knowledge of the corporation‘s compliance policies and 
procedures to serve as the monitor‘s primary point of contact and to assist 
with each review.  The goal should be no surprises for either the monitor or 
the company, so constant communication is imperative and should include 
iterative work plans, planning meetings prior to any substantive work, and 
mid-review meetings, to name a few. 
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V. SOME GUIDANCE FOR COMPANIES FACING AN FCPA MONITORSHIP 
After exploring thoroughly the nature of FCPA monitorships and 
offering some advice on how they can work better, this article concludes 
with some guidance for companies that face an FCPA monitor.  As 
discussed in the introduction, there are few punishments that companies 
dislike more than a monitor.  The monitor is an uninvited guest who almost 
always outstays his or her welcome, but as with typical in-laws, the 
company must continue to welcome the monitor and his or her annual raft 
of recommendations with open arms.  What follows are some tips on how a 
company can minimize the pain of this experience and realize greater value 
from the monitorship process. 
A.  Carefully Negotiate the Terms of the Settlement Agreement 
As discussed above, a monitor acts in accordance with the settlement 
agreement between the government and the company.  Before the company 
even begins to consider the process of selecting an FCPA compliance 
monitor, it must focus on negotiating the best agreement possible with, 
hopefully, the least onerous burdens as are feasible to help ensure 
compliance with the FCPA.  Many FCPA settlement agreements contain 
inconsistencies and imprecise language that could permit a monitor to 
make unreasonable demands.  The company must read, analyze, and 
negotiate each sentence of the settlement agreement extremely carefully.  
During this scrubbing process, it should insert clarifying text wherever 
possible. 
One area where companies have negotiated different wording is in the 
certification required of the monitor during the follow-up reviews.  Small 
changes can make a big difference in the obligations imposed on the 
monitor and, ultimately, the inconvenience and cost inuring to the 
company.  Like most FCPA settlements, the terms of Statoil‘s monitor 
requirement provide that during each of his follow-up reviews, Statoil‘s 
monitor must ―certify whether Statoil‘s anti-bribery compliance program, 
including its policies and procedures, is appropriately designed and 
implemented to ensure compliance with the FCPA.‖
184
  The requirement 
that Statoil‘s policies and procedures ensure compliance with the FCPA is 
in tension with the monitor‘s mandate in the same document.  The mandate 
is to determine ―whether Statoil‘s policies and procedures are reasonably 
 
 184. Statoil Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 152, at 11 (emphasis added); 
Cease-and-Desist Order, Statoil, Exchange Act Release No. 54599 (Oct. 13, 2006), 
available at www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54599.pdf (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter Statoil Cease-and-Desist Order]. 
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designed to detect and prevent violations of the FCPA.‖
185
  The concept that 
an effective program inevitably involves the detection of violations 
implicitly acknowledges that no compliance program, even the most 
effective ever created, is airtight.  This is an unassailable contention, as 
large multinational companies will inevitably have employees who 
intentionally circumvent internal controls or worse.  Therefore, the 
existence of the word ―ensure,‖ which connotes total security, complicates 
the duty of the monitor and will almost certainly lead to a more exacting 
review. 
In its global FCPA settlement, Siemens headed off this problem.  The 
certification mandate for the monitor mirrors his actual review mandate:  he 
must ―certify whether the compliance program of Siemens, including its 
policies and procedures, is reasonably designed and implemented to detect 
and prevent violations within Siemens of the anti-corruption laws.‖
186
  This 
simple change comforts the monitor since the program need only be 
calibrated to the level of corruption risk facing the entity and not to an 
ultimately quixotic level of anti-bribery compliance.  In doing so, it may 
save the company millions of dollars in monitor‘s fees and internal costs to 
implement additional controls. 
Indeed, the Siemens settlement featured a number of deviations from 
the standard FCPA monitorship mandate.  Notably, it provided that the 
monitor‘s review did not need to be comprehensive:  ―The Monitor is not 
expected to conduct a comprehensive review of all business lines, all 
business activities or all markets.‖
187
  Undoubtedly, Siemens was concerned 
that its monitorship would involve probes of all of its countless business 
lines and geographically ubiquitous operations.  It included this language to 
guard against just such abuses.  Likewise, other companies facing FCPA 
monitorships should consider how their monitor could spin out of control, 
identify the aspects of the business he or she may find particularly vexing, 
as well as the compliance risks that are likely to become an unwarranted 
focus, and try to guard against such problems by inserting appropriate 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Siemens Final Judgment, supra note 94, at 10-11; Statement of Offense at 
Attachment 2, ¶ 6, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-367 (D.D.C. 2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/siemens-ag-stmt-offense.pdf [hereinafter 
Siemens Statement of Offense]. 
 187. Siemens Final Judgment, supra note 94, at 7-8; Siemens Statement of Offense, 
supra note 186, at Attachment 2 at ¶ 3.  See also Siemens Consent, supra note 94, at 5-6 
(―The Monitor‘s work plan for the initial review shall include such steps as are reasonably 
necessary to conduct an effective initial review in accordance with the mandate . . . to the 
extent the Monitor deems appropriate . . . .‖). 
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language in the settlement documents.  Among the explicit parameters all 
settlement agreements should feature are clear deadlines for annual reviews 
and reporting, adoption of recommendations, and completion of the 
monitorship.  The timelines for performing certain tasks are one of the key 
ways to hem in costs and guard against abuses.  Of course, it is vital that 
the relevant language be identical for both the DOJ and SEC agreements if 
the company settles with both agencies.  Indeed, all settlement documents 
should contain substantively identical descriptions of the company‘s 
responsibilities and the monitor‘s role.  Differences can only foment 
confusion. 
When focusing on timelines and obligations, companies should not 
neglect their own duties.  One area of confusion in some FCPA settlements 
is whether the company must ―implement‖ or ―adopt‖ the monitor‘s 
recommendations within 120 days.  The standard settlement agreement 
discusses ―the time period for implementation‖ of the monitor‘s 
recommendations, while also noting that the company must ―adopt all 
recommendations in the report.‖
188
  Clearly, an organization can formally 
adopt a particular reform long before it implements it globally.  In fact, 
most multinationals will find 120 days an alarmingly short time period to 
roll out any significant changes.
189
  Unless companies are extremely careful 
in negotiating with the government for the right words in their settlement 
agreements, they can face significant burdens during the monitorship.  
Other thorny areas that should be clearly addressed in the settlement 
agreements include the reporting obligations if the monitor uncovers 
potentially illegal conduct or encounters intentionally uncooperative 
employees. 
Finally, the settlement agreements provide an opportunity for the 
company to try to limit the expenses incurred during the monitorship.  A 
number of innovations are potentially available to the settling entity.  Most 
usefully, it can try to obtain a provision allowing for a sunset of the 
monitorship under certain conditions.  Nothing will save as much money as 
simply having the monitorship terminate early.  The Morford 
Memorandum stated that ―in most cases, an agreement should provide for 
early termination if the corporation can demonstrate to the government that 
there exists a change in circumstances sufficient to eliminate the need for a 
monitor.‖
190
  Accordingly, most post-Morford Memorandum settlement 
 
 188. Siemens Final Judgment, supra note 94, at 14; York Int‘l Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, supra note 141, at 13-14; Statoil Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 
152, at 10-11; see also Control Components Plea Agreement, supra note 153 (stating that all 
recommendations must be adopted). 
 189. To avoid further complicating this challenge, it is helpful to map out the various 
holidays and corporate priorities that could complicate implementation. 
 190. Morford Memo, supra note 28. 
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agreements include a sunset provision, including those of Willbros,
191
 
KBR,
192
 AGA Medical,
193
 Siemens,
194
 and Daimler.
195
 Companies also 
should try to negotiate agreements that rely on the company‘s own internal 
resources for some of the analyses, studies, and testing.  This is another 
area where the Siemens settlement provides a good example:  ―[T]he 
Monitor is encouraged to coordinate with Siemens personnel including 
auditors and compliance personnel and, to the extent the Monitor deems 
appropriate, he or she may rely on Siemens processes, on the results of 
studies, reviews, audits and analyses conducted by or on behalf of Siemens 
and on sampling and testing methodologies.‖
196
  Additionally, although it 
may prove a difficult negotiation point, if the alleged misconduct was 
limited in scope, the company could attempt to negotiate an agreement 
where the monitor only oversees the rogue business unit, or at the very 
least, to have the monitor concentrate primarily on the main area or areas 
that caused the underlying violations. 
Although it is tempting to focus on the dollar figures associated with 
the settlement and the need for the organization to move forward and put 
the criminal matter behind it, it is important to negotiate the terms of the 
settlement agreement very carefully and make sure that the company‘s 
three-year guest has clear ground rules under which to operate. 
 
 191. See Willbros Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 105, at 3 (―Conversely, 
in the event the Department finds, in its sole discretion, that there exists a change in 
circumstances sufficient to eliminate the need for the Monitor, the term of the Agreement 
may be terminated early.‖). 
 192. See Kellogg Brown & Root Plea Agreement, supra note 138, at Exhibit 2 at 6 
(―[T]he Monitor may apply to the Department for permission to forego the second follow-up 
review.‖). 
 193. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. AGA Medical Corp., No. 0:08-
cr-00172 (D. Minn. June 3, 2008) available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/ 
cases/docs/06-03-08aga-agree.pdf (―Conversely, in the event the Department finds, in its 
sole discretion, that there exists a change in circumstances . . . the Term of the Agreement 
may be terminated early.‖). 
 194. Siemens Final Judgment, supra note 94, at 10 (―[T]he Monitor may apply to the 
Commission staff for permission to forego the third follow-up review.‖). 
 195. Daimler Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 5 (―Conversely, in the event 
the Department finds, in its sole discretion, that there exists a change in circumstances . . . 
the Term of the Agreement may be terminated early.‖).  
 196. Siemens Consent, supra note 94, at 5-6; Siemens Final Judgment, supra, note 94, at 
7-8; Siemens Statement of Offense, supra note 186, Attachment 2, ¶ 3.  See also Technip 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122 (requiring terms that rely on company‘s 
internal resources in a deferred prosecution agreement); Control Components Plea 
Agreement, supra note 153 (outlining terms that utilize existing resources in a plea 
agreement). 
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B.  Selection of a Monitor 
Generally, the company must select a monitor who is acceptable to the 
government.
197
 As discussed above, the government will ultimately play an 
active role in this selection process—a reality that BAES experienced first 
hand.  Indeed, for this reason, the company should communicate constantly 
with the government during the process, so that the prosecutors understand 
the company‘s methodology and its good faith in selecting the most 
effective and efficient monitor.  The monitor selection process is yet 
another area where the company needs to exercise the utmost caution and 
perform extensive due diligence.  Remember that even well-crafted 
settlement agreements will still surely grant the FCPA monitor a great deal 
of control over the company.  If a monitor becomes abusive, runs up 
massive fees, or exceeds his or her mandate, the corporation may be stuck 
in an unproductive and costly relationship.  Ultimately, a handful of key 
characteristics should serve as the central points of inquiry in selecting the 
monitor.  These include the FCPA background of the prospective monitor, 
his or her experience with similarly situated companies, and his or her view 
of the role of an FCPA monitor. 
1. FCPA Background 
Possibly nothing is more important than the background and 
reputation of the prospective FCPA monitor.  The company should contact 
as many clients and practitioners as possible to develop a clear picture of 
how the particular candidate behaves professionally.  As an obvious 
prerequisite, the monitor and his or her firm must have a large, dynamic 
FCPA practice.  This is important for a number of reasons.  First, the 
company does not want the monitor and his or her colleagues to be 
developing an understanding of the FCPA or best practices relating to 
internal controls and compliance policies during the monitorship.  They 
should know all of this already, so that the company pays only for the 
actual analysis of its own systems. 
Ideally, the monitor and his team will also have substantive experience 
with FCPA monitorships, either in the role of monitor or counsel to a 
 
 197. See, e.g., Control Components Plea Agreement, supra note 153, at 14 (―The 
Department retains the right, in its sole discretion, to accept or reject any Monitor proposed 
by CCI pursuant to the Agreement.‖); Faro Techs. Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 100, 
at 5 (―Retain . . . an independent consultant . . . not unacceptable to the staff of the‖ SEC.); 
Cease-and-Desist Order at 5, Delta & Pine Land Co. and Turk Deltapine, Inc., Exchange 
Act Release No. 56138, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2658 (July 26, 
2007) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2007/34-56138.pdf (―Retain, 
through Delta & Pine‘s Board of Directors, within 60 days after the entry of this order, an 
independent consultant . . . not unacceptable to the staff of the Commission.‖). 
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company that has had an FCPA monitor.  As with most lawyers‘ 
professional conduct generally, the past tends to be prologue.  If the 
monitor was abusive in his last engagement, he will probably be abusive in 
future monitorships. 
Deep experience with a wide variety of clients and in a number of 
different settings will also make it more likely that the monitor will take a 
measured, balanced view of what an effective compliance program looks 
like.  It is essential that the monitor appreciate the complexities of 
multinational organizations and the compliance challenges that attend 
them.  A panicky monitor who sees conspiracies and massive failures of 
corporate culture behind every isolated incident can cause unwarranted 
headaches for the company. 
Quite candidly, it is also important that the monitor have other clients 
and obligations.  The open-ended nature of the FCPA compliance 
monitorship can tempt an unethical monitor to expend vast amounts of time 
and effort inefficiently peering into every corner of the corporation, rather 
than utilizing a risk-based methodology that applies appropriate sampling.  
If the monitor has clients and other commitments demanding his or her 
time, the chances of such abuse decline dramatically.  Further, a monitor 
with a large and active private practice needs to worry about his or her 
professional reputation.  Behavior on the part of the monitor that the 
company sees as abusive will not stay private forever—as Attorney 
General John Ashcroft‘s experience showed—and repeat players are less 
likely to overstep their bounds. 
Importantly, all of these attributes should extend to the monitor‘s 
team.  The company should request in advance a description of the 
backgrounds of the foot soldiers who will likely execute the lion‘s share of 
the fieldwork for the monitor.  They should share these aforementioned 
qualities, as it does little good for an experienced FCPA practitioner to be 
surrounded by novices who will undoubtedly flounder during the early 
stages of the monitorship and expend unreasonable amounts of time on 
basic tasks. 
2. Experience with Similarly Situated Companies 
Just as he or she must be an FCPA expert, the monitor also should 
have a background working with companies like the one receiving the 
monitor.  It is important for any lawyer to understand the business of his or 
her corporate client, but the relevance of this element of an effective legal 
representation is significantly amplified in the monitorship context.  For the 
monitor to be effective, he or she must develop a thorough understanding 
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of the company‘s global business and that business‘s inherent exposure to 
corruption risk, as well as the systems and procedures that govern it.  It is 
rare that lawyers in private practice need to develop such a comprehensive 
view of a corporation‘s business model and practices.  This job will be 
much easier if the monitor and his team already have similar clients.  The 
flatter the learning curve, the more focused and effective the monitorship, 
and the lower the costs. 
3. View of the Monitorship 
There is no reason why, in the course of interviewing a prospective 
monitor, the company cannot ask pointed questions about how the monitor 
sees his or her role.  The company will want to listen for assurances that he 
or she will religiously adhere to the terms of the settlement agreements, 
constantly communicate with the company about findings and possible 
recommendations, maintain the utmost efficiency in the conduct of 
fieldwork, and operate cooperatively with the company as much as 
possible.  This is the same point at which the corporation should request 
from the candidate a detailed budget for the monitorship‘s initial review, as 
discussed below.  Any reluctance on the part of the candidate to make these 
assurances or to disclose his or her vision for the tasks at hand should be 
considered a significant red flag. 
4. Personal Characteristics 
Finally, it is important not to discount the rapport the leaders of the 
company feel they have with the prospective monitor.  The best 
monitorships involve cooperation and communication—both of which are 
easier if the people involved simply get along.  The company will want to 
avoid candidates who appear abrasive, imperious, or solipsistic.  Beyond 
the monitor himself or herself, those tendencies can be magnified by the 
members of the monitorship team, who will undoubtedly reflect the tone at 
the top in the manner in which they interact with the organization.  Of 
course, it is best if the company can confirm its perception of those 
personal characteristics by talking to clients and professional contacts of 
the prospective monitor. 
C.  Managing the Monitor 
Having touched on monitor selection, the discussion now turns to 
managing the monitor that the company selects.  This section provides 
some tips for ensuring that the company‘s FCPA monitorship is as effective 
and efficient as possible.  Importantly, the first recommendation, 
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concerning the usefulness of obtaining a detailed annual budget, should 
initially occur before the selection of any monitor.  These measures serve as 
vehicles for the company to increase the transparency and efficiency of the 
monitor‘s fieldwork. 
1.  Obtaining a Detailed Budget 
It is very difficult to limit the cost of a monitorship.  Some monitors 
will claim that any attempt at budgeting or capping fees will undermine 
their independence.  But a monitorship is different from an investigation or 
litigation—it is very predictable.  Like an auditor, the monitor should be 
able to provide a detailed budget that reflects his or her vision for the 
engagement. 
In advance of selecting the monitor, the company should obtain a 
budget that will be complied with absent unusual or changed 
circumstances.  The candidate‘s budget should show projected attorney 
time spent on the key activities of the monitorship, including reviewing 
documents and preparing for, conducting, and documenting meetings and 
interviews.  The budget should also estimate the cost of producing the 
initial report.  If possible, the company could also ask the monitor to 
project fees and expenses beyond the first year of the monitorship, although 
this may be more difficult. 
Once the monitorship begins, the company should request periodic 
updates from the monitor on the current level of fees and whether he or she 
is on budget.  This will allow it to raise potential cost overruns with the 
monitor immediately and prevent surprises about the cost of particular 
tasks.  If certain tasks are unreasonably expensive, the company can work 
with the monitor to reduce their cost.  In additional to providing the 
company with a window on the monitor‘s activities, the budgetary process 
will force the monitor and his team to consider the cost of their activities 
and adjust accordingly.  The goal here, like much of monitor management, 
is to prevent the engagement from becoming the proverbial ―gravy train.‖ 
2.  Obtaining a Detailed Timeline 
A detailed timeline is also important for controlling costs.  By pegging 
a timeline to the budget, the company and the monitor can better manage 
costs and increase transparency.  The timeline will also allow the company 
to prepare for the monitorship better and help ensure that there are no 
surprises. 
An initial proposed timeline from the monitor candidate should show 
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when he or she will do the following: 
 Meet with company employees in advance of the 
fieldwork to learn about the business, its corruption risk 
assessments, and its compliance program; 
 Conduct fieldwork at relevant company locations—the 
approximate number of interviews and the amount of 
time on the ground; 
 Review relevant documents (both the amount and type of 
documents); 
 Write the report; 
 Present findings from the report to the relevant 
government agencies; and 
 Prepare for each follow-up review (and, ideally, how the 
follow-up reviews will differ from the initial review). 
Like the budget, the timeline will serve the dual role of providing 
transparency regarding the process, while disciplining the monitor and his 
or her team. 
3. Establish a Single Point of Contact 
Few things are more important to ensuring a positive experience with 
a company‘s FCPA monitor than having a single point of contact, a 
company official or office that can speak for the organization being 
monitored.  And ultimately, the company needs to have one person who 
can speak authoritatively for it and represent its interests in the monitorship 
process.  This is harder than it sounds, as the monitor will undoubtedly 
have contact with a wide range of company stakeholders, including 
members of the board.  For this reason, it is important that everyone 
understand at the beginning of the process who will speak for the 
organization (usually the general counsel or a senior legal official) and 
monitor the engagement.  It is vital that the monitor not have back channels 
to other senior officials in the company, who may not be as savvy about the 
process or understand exactly what the monitor is doing.  Finally, whoever 
the contact person is must have sufficient authority to aid the monitor in the 
review and recommendation implementation process.  In particular, 
regional leaders should not feel free to disregard directives about 
cooperating with the monitor.  Such a strong central point of contact, 
therefore, also benefits the monitor by serving as a reliable partner and aid 
in the entire process. 
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4. Marshall Internal Resources to Assist the Monitor 
No corporation subject to an FCPA compliance monitor should expect 
the process to be a painless or inexpensive experience.  In light of the 
various inconveniences and the overall cost, companies may be tempted to 
provide minimal resources for the monitor to utilize.  Often, this can be a 
huge mistake.  By not supporting the monitor, the company risks that the 
monitor deploys his or her own resources or hires outside vendors to do 
what the company is not doing.  In fact, by putting significant resources 
and information at the monitor‘s disposal at the beginning of the process, 
the company might very well save money. 
Most obviously, the company should provide upfront for the monitor a 
complete description of the nature of its past violative conduct, the 
subsequent remedial actions, and the current state of its FCPA compliance 
program.  The organization should have all of this information at its 
fingertips; there is no reason to make the monitor expend countless billable 
hours developing this factual basis for the initial review.  Additionally, the 
corporation should give the monitorship team a reasonably detailed 
overview of its business and operations.  As discussed above, without 
knowing the business, the monitor cannot possibly assess the company‘s 
anti-bribery policies and procedures.  It may be a significant and 
unnecessary cost for the monitor to develop an understanding of the 
business through fieldwork. 
The company should also consider assigning its employees to the 
monitorship team for each review period.  Having employees working 
under the direction of the monitor will almost always be significantly 
cheaper than paying the hourly rates of a legal, consulting, or forensic 
auditing professional.  Further, company employees will know the 
organization better than an outside vendor.  They can help give the monitor 
confidence that the review does not have any significant blind spots.  Some 
FCPA monitors have found it particularly efficient to utilize the resources 
of internal audit, as those employees often conduct reviews similar to what 
the monitor is performing. 
5. Preview the Report and Recommendations 
Finally, it is entirely reasonable for the company to request access to 
the monitor‘s report and recommendations in advance of the U.S. 
authorities.  This is good for the monitor and for the company.  It is good 
for the company because it ensures that the report will not be a total 
surprise upon submission, and more importantly, the preview will allow the 
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corporation to correct any errors in the monitor‘s report.  It is also a chance 
to vet the monitor‘s recommendations with internal stakeholders at the 
company and determine their feasibility.  If they can be changed slightly in 
advance to make implementation easier, they should be.  For the monitor, 
what is most helpful about this advance review is the company‘s 
opportunity to correct factual errors.  Nothing could be more embarrassing 
to a responsible monitor than to have his or her work corrected by the 
corporation in front of the U.S. regulators.  And ultimately, there is no 
reason why either the U.S. government or the monitor should fear the 
company having an opportunity to comment on the monitor‘s work in 
advance. 
D.  Preventing Others from Exploiting the Monitorship Relationship 
One final consideration for an organization facing the imposition of an 
FCPA monitor is how to help prevent outside parties from utilizing the 
monitor‘s work for their own benefit—most likely, securities plaintiffs 
seeking to exploit the monitor‘s fieldwork.  The monitor‘s work makes two 
categories of information vulnerable to discovery.  First, the monitor, as an 
independent outside party with whom the company does not have an 
attorney-client relationship, may risk waiving privilege on internal 
company materials.  In particular, it is likely that the monitor will need to 
review some internal investigation reports drafted by or at the direction of 
company counsel.  This may render these materials discoverable in a civil 
lawsuit.  Second, it is possible that the monitorship process itself will 
identify and document information that could aid in a lawsuit. 
The company should work with the monitor to minimize both of these 
risks, as they will undermine the monitorship, in addition to hurting the 
company.  At the very least, the company should include a privilege non-
waiver agreement as part of the monitor‘s retention agreement to try to 
prevent otherwise privileged information from becoming discoverable.  
The language of such an agreement may read as follows: 
In the event that any third party seeks disclosure of materials that 
may be protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product 
doctrine, pursuant to court order or otherwise, the monitor shall 
(a) notify the company and make all reasonable efforts to allow 
the company to resist such disclosure on the basis that the 
materials are protected by the attorney-client privilege, and/or 
work product doctrine, or similar protective doctrine, and 
(b) support the company‘s position.  The monitor may disclose 
the materials pursuant to a protective order if disclosure is 
required by court order. 
It is unclear, however, whether a court would view any applicable 
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privilege as preserved.  Some courts have recognized the doctrine of 
―limited waiver‖ when a company provides information as part of 
cooperation with a governmental investigation.
198
  These courts consider 
the privilege waived only as to the government entity or agent that receives 
the privileged information; the company can continue to assert attorney-
client privilege if an outside party attempts to obtain the information.  The 
majority of courts, however, do not accept the concept of limited waiver.  
In fact, in 2006 one federal court observed that ―every appellate court that 
ha[d] considered the issue in the last twenty-five years‖ had held that a 
company and its attorneys could not ―waive the attorney-client privilege 
selectively.‖
199
 
But a recent D.C. Circuit ruling could provide some independent basis 
for enforcing a non-waiver of privilege agreement.  The court held that 
when a corporation provides attorney work product regarding anticipated 
litigation with the IRS to its auditors in connection with the audit of the 
company‘s financial statements, it does not waive the work product 
protection.
200
  The court explained that, even though the auditors were an 
independent party—much like a monitor—disclosure to them was not a 
waiver because the auditors were not an adversary of the company.
201
  The 
 
 198. See Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en 
banc) (determining that a limited waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurred, because 
the corporation voluntarily surrendered material protected by the privilege in the context of 
a separate and nonpublic investigation by the SEC); see, e.g., In re Target Tech Co., LLC, 
208 F. App‘x 825, 827 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding waiver based on an extrajudicial disclosure 
that revealed the attorney‘s conclusion, but did not reveal the details of the privileged 
communication, and stating that when ordering production in light of the waiver, the court 
should ensure that its order is limited to the subject matter of the disclosure); Bittaker v. 
Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that a district court must enter 
appropriate orders clearly delineating the contours of the limited waiver before the 
commencement of discovery, and strictly police those limits thereafter); In re Woolworth 
Corp. Sec. Class Action Litig., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7773, *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 1996) 
(―A finding that publication of an internal investigative report constitutes waiver might well 
discourage corporations from taking the responsible step of employing outside counsel to 
conduct an investigation when wrongdoing is suspected.‖). 
 199. See United States v. Reyes, 239 F.R.D. 591, 603 (N.D. Cal. 2006)   (rejecting the 
concept of limited waiver); see, e.g., Ratliff v. Davis Polk & Wardell, 354 F.3d 165, 170 n.5 
(2d Cir. 2003) (―This court has previously rejected a ‗limited waiver‘ rule that would 
preserve attorney-client privilege even after documents had been disclosed to a third party, 
such as the SEC.‖ (quoting In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d. Cir. 1982))); In re 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting the concept of limited waiver in all forms and collecting cases discussing limited 
waiver). 
 200. United States v. Deloitte, LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 201. Id. at 140. 
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court relied in part on the fact that the company had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in light of the auditor‘s duty of confidentiality under 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants‘ rules.
202
  In doing so, 
the court extended work product protection to a document authored by the 
audit team recording statements of counsel that reflected their work 
product.
203
  It rejected arguments by the IRS that the auditors‘ duty to issue 
a report meant that the company had waived workproduct protection.  
Using this logic, companies could attempt to include a confidentiality 
agreement in their retention agreements with the monitor and then ask 
courts to apply the same reasoning whenever faced with a discovery 
request. 
One other possibility for avoiding waiver could be to seek a court 
order under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d): 
A federal court order that the attorney-client privilege or work 
product protection is not waived as a result of disclosure in 
connection with the litigation pending before the court governs 
all persons or entities in all state or federal proceedings, whether 
or not they were parties to the matter before the court, if the order 
incorporates the agreement of the parties before the court.
204
 
If the monitorship is pursuant to a DPA, it seems that Rule 502(d) may 
apply if the judge were willing to issue a court order mandating that 
information disclosed to the monitor or his or her team in the course of the 
monitorship does not waive privilege. 
As tricky as it may be to avoid having the monitorship waive privilege 
or work product protection, it may be even harder to avoid discovery of the 
monitor‘s work that is not otherwise protected.  Presumably, a party suing 
the company could subpoena the monitor‘s non-privileged work product.  It 
is largely unclear what a company may do to protect these types of 
documents, but there is some case law that could be used to cobble together 
a protection. 
Indeed, then-district court Judge Patrick Higginbotham may have 
provided some basis for synthesizing such a privilege in his In re LTV 
Securities Litigation opinion.
205
  That case featured a court-appointed 
Special Officer, who serves a role quite similar to that of a monitor.  The 
court explained: 
There are important differences between the role of the Special 
Officer and that of the ordinary counsel. Unlike the situation 
typically presented where counsel has been hired in anticipation 
of civil or criminal liability, . . . the Special Officer here was 
 
 202. Id. at 142. 
 203. Id. at 139. 
 204. FED. R. EVID. 502(d). 
 205. In re LTV Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
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retained by LTV to implement an SEC consent decree.  
Atypically, LTV, the ―client,‖ is not the final arbiter of the 
Special Officer‘s duties, functions or authority.  That power is 
held by the court, which may resolve any disagreement between 
LTV and the Special Officer concerning his duties, functions or 
authority.  The Final Judgment identifies certain duties owed to 
the Special Officer.  LTV must ―cooperate fully‖ with the Special 
Officer, may not assert against the Special Officer any corporate 
privilege except as to matters prepared for or by LTV in the 
course of the SEC investigation, and must authorize the directors, 
officers, employees and agents of LTV to testify under oath and 
provide all requested information.
206
 
Additionally, the court noted that ―the Special Officer has obligations 
toward the SEC that may conflict with the normal duties owed a client by 
private counsel.‖
207
  It was also stated that, ―[a]t the Commission‘s 
discretion, [the Special Officer] must furnish the SEC any documents, 
statements or other information in his possession as well as reports or 
recommendations he prepares prior to submitting them to LTV.‖
208
  Thus, 
the district court observed that ―the Special Officer is more akin to a public 
official than privately retained counsel,‖ and in its hybrid role of 
―government investigator and privately retained counsel,‖ ―the sphere of 
confidentiality which the Special Officer might expect to enjoy is a 
synthesis of the privileges available to his ‗clients‘ were he serving in the 
roles of government investigator or private investigatory counsel.‖
209
 
The district court first concluded that ―if the Special Officer were 
privately retained counsel, the information he is now gathering would be 
protected from all discovery unless supported by good cause.‖
210
  It then 
went on to explain that ―[t]he SEC has indicated that this investigation, if 
conducted by SEC employees, is the type of investigation ordinarily 
considered confidential under the Commission‘s regulations.‖
211
  The court 
noted that the information collected would not likely be discoverable 
through a FOIA request.
212
  Finally, the court considered the ―immediate 
adverse impact on the ongoing investigation‖ that the discovery request 
would have and weighed the ―long-term effect of permitting this type of 
 
 206. Id. at 614. 
 207. Id. at 614-15. 
 208. Id. at 615. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 616. 
 211. Id. at 617. 
 212. Id. 
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discovery,‖ as ―the SEC will seek to negotiate [similar] consent decrees.‖
213
  
It contended: 
If such discovery is permitted, a corporation concerned about its 
exposure to civil liability would be more willing to risk SEC 
investigation, particularly in light of the exemption from public 
disclosure generally afforded the Commission‘s investigatory 
records.  Allowing the type of discovery requested here may kill 
the goose that lays the golden egg – the Commission may be 
deprived of a useful enforcement option, while shareholders will 
hardly be benefited by inhibiting corporate self-investigation.
214
 
It was observed that ―[t]he SEC simply cannot staff individual cases 
with lawyers of [the Special Officer‘s] experience, skill and support 
facilities; at least not without great risk of misallocation of its resources.‖
215
  
Thus, the district court opined that there existed a privilege—unique from 
but derivative of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine—
that ―sets a standard of protection akin to that of work-product under Rule 
26(b).‖
216
 
Although the facts of the LTV case and those presented when a 
monitor is retained by a company are similar, key differences remain that 
make it difficult to predict whether an analogous privilege could apply to 
monitorships.  First, as noted above, there is no attorney-client relationship 
between the company and monitor.  The LTV opinion did not indicate 
whether the existence of an attorney-client relationship was explicitly 
foreclosed in that matter, as it is in almost all settlement agreements that 
require the retention of a monitor.  Additionally, in LTV, the Special 
Officer had discretion under the Final Judgment to request that the SEC 
keep the Special Officer‘s report confidential, and the Special Officer‘s 
retention agreement required him to do so.
217
  But for many monitorship 
 
 213. Id. at 619. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 622. See also United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying LTV ruling to non-disclosure provision of consent decree). 
 217. Id. at 615.  See also United States v. MIT, 129 F.3d 681, 683 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting 
that, in declining to apply the Diversified ruling, there was ―no unconditional promise to 
keep the [disclosed] documents secret‖); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) (finding no error in district court ruling ordering disclosure where no confidentiality 
agreement existed); In re Leslie Fay Cos. Sec. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 274, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(holding that, where U.S. Attorney ―agreed to hold all materials produced . . . in 
confidence,‖ no waiver of attorney-client privilege occurred);  Enron Corp. v. Borget, 1990 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12471, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1990) (―In making its submission to the 
SEC, Enron specifically reserved all applicable legal privileges and rejected any implication 
of waiver from their submission.‖); SEC v. Amster & Co., 126 F.R.D. 28, 29-30 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (stating that privilege was not waived even though there had been an agreement with 
the SEC to maintain the confidentiality of disclosed documents). 
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agreements, the applicable confidentiality provision is limited in scope and 
only applies to the monitor, not to the government.
218
 
Despite these meaningful differences, there exist good arguments—
based on public policy concerns and derived from the limited waiver cases, 
the D.C. Circuit‘s ruling, and Judge Higginbotham‘s LTV opinion—that a 
company can advance in an attempt to protect the monitor‘s work product. 
First, permitting third-party discovery punishes corporate offenders 
for entering into FCPA settlements with the SEC and DOJ.  Courts should 
encourage such agreements rather than force companies to fight 
investigations, taxing judicial and agency resources while hindering 
enforcement and remedial action. 
Second, the monitor can assert that he or she is really acting as an 
adjunct to a governmental investigation, not as private counsel.  In this 
capacity, the monitor and his or her team should enjoy protections similar 
to those of federal investigators. 
Third, any discovery requests contemporaneous with the monitor‘s 
activities will hinder the monitor‘s ongoing efforts by siphoning human and 
financial resources dedicated to monitoring the company. 
While these are valid arguments in favor of denying a discovery 
request and granting some sort of privilege, in the absence of either a 
confidentiality agreement with the government or an attorney-client 
relationship between the company and the monitor, any claims of privilege 
are unlikely to succeed.  In addition, the case law is far from consistent 
across all circuits on whether this type of privilege may be asserted.  It is 
therefore advisable that all parties proceed as if resisting discovery requests 
will fail in the end. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, irrespective of how companies view FCPA monitorships, 
they are, by all indications, here to stay.  It therefore behooves corporations 
facing an FCPA enforcement action, the FCPA enforcers at the SEC and 
DOJ, and monitors themselves to understand the recent history of FCPA 
monitorships and consider how they can work better.  As the U.S. 
 
 218. See Statoil Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra 152, at ¶ 12 (―[T]he Compliance 
Consultant shall agree to maintain the confidentiality of Statoil‘s trade secrets and other 
confidential business information in conformity with Norwegian law, and to give due 
consideration to Statoil‘s need for operational flexibility and preservation of business 
relationships with third parties, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the 
Compliance Consultant from sharing such confidential information with the Commission 
staff and DOJ.‖). 
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government‘s FCPA enforcement efforts become more robust, all potential 
stakeholders need to weigh carefully when the imposition of a monitor will 
lead to a better corporate citizen and when it is more likely to be a 
redundant, punitive measure.  In situations that may call for an independent 
compliance monitor, all participants should seek to maximize the value of 
the monitorship and minimize inefficiency.  In the final analysis, this will 
help reduce the frequency of future FCPA violations and lead to a more 
effective enforcement regime. 
 
 
